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INTRODUCTION 
This Article addresses a legal issue that is arising with 
increasing frequency; whether a political campaign’s use of a 
song—without the permission of its performer—infringes on any 
trademark rights of the performer. 
To contextualize the issue, this Article begins by recounting a 
number of high-profile complaints by singers about political 
campaigns playing their songs.  Next, it outlines the relevant 
provisions of the Lanham Act and case law pertaining to non-
traditional trademarks, and considers whether music can function 
as a singer trademark.  In doing so, it constructs and scrutinizes the 
viability of a theory of “song-mark” protection as well as the way 
that it would intersect with and contradict provisions of the 
Copyright Act.  Then, assuming arguendo that a singer is entitled 
to such protection, this article analyzes whether campaign uses of 
music meet the requirements of “false endorsement” so as to 
constitute trademark infringement.  Ultimately, this Article 
concludes that while, in theory, a song-based trademark could 
exist, in practice it would either fail to acquire the appropriate 
secondary meaning or be precluded—if not preempted—by 
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Copyright law.  Moreover, even if these substantive and procedural 
hurdles were cleared, it is doubtful that a political campaign’s 
playing of a song would confuse or mislead consumers under the 
Lanham Act. 
I. MUSIC AND POLITICS 
Today, popular music is a standard component of any political 
campaign.1  It is used to energize crowds,2 articulate campaign 
messages,3 and attract young voters.4  Although it was not the first 
to integrate music into a campaign, 5 the contemporary practice 
can be traced to Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign.6
                                                                                                             
1 See Matthew J. Cursio, Born To Be Used In The USA: An Alternative Avenue For 
Evaluating Politicians’ Unauthorized Use of Original Musical Performances on the 
Campaign Trail, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 317 (2011); Eriq Gardner, Michele 
Bachmann in Legal Spat for Using Tom Petty’s ‘American Girl’ at Rally, HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER, (June 28, 2011, 11:48 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/michele-bachmann-legal-spat-using-206257; Chris Richards, Campaigns Adopting 
Songs Is Nothing New, But Squabbles With Musicians Are, WASH. POST (June 29, 2011), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-06-29/lifestyle/35265463_1_theme-songs-
campaign-season-appearances. 
  
2 See James C. McKinley, G.O.P. Candidates Are Told, Don’t Use the Verses, It’s Not 
Your Song, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/02/04/arts/music/romney-and-gingrich-pull-songs-after-
complaints.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
3 See Cursio, supra note 1, at 317; McKinley, supra note 2 (explaining that candidates 
use music for two purposes: to motivate supporters and to underline a campaign 
message); see also Gardner, supra note 1 (discussing use of music in advertisements). 
4 See Gardner, supra note 1, (Bachmann wanted to use a certain song to “score 
points” with audience); Kenneth Kidd, Politicians and Rock Music: A Legal Wango 
Tango, TORONTO STAR, July 2, 2011, http://www.thestar.com/news/insight/2011/07/02/
politicians_and_rock_music_a_legal_wango_tango.html  (rock music is often used by 
candidates to cater to young voters). 
5 See Richards, supra note 1 (Politicians have used music since the late 1800s, but the 
practice became popular only recently.); see also Guy Dixon, Do Not Use My Song Ever 
Again, Globe Review, Music and Politics, GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada) (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/music/knaan-to-mitt-romney-dont-use-my-
music/article542793 (Franklin Roosevelt’s campaign adopted “Happy Days Are Here 
Again” and John F. Kennedy’s campaign used Frank Sinatra’s “High Hopes” 
accompanied by Sinatra’s endorsement.) 
6 See Stephen Battaglio, The Biz: Arsenio Hall Talks Back, TV GUIDE (June 27, 2012, 
7:01 AM), http://www.tvguide.com/news/arsenio-hall-talks-1049221.aspx (describing 
how Clinton’s guest appearance changed the rules of campaigning); Hardball with Chris 
Matthews (MSNBC television broadcast June 26, 2012) (describing Clinton’s iconic 
campaign moments and “masterful” campaigning). 
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Clinton adopted Fleetwood Mac’s “Don’t Stop (Thinkin’ About 
Tomorrow),” playing it every day, at every event.7  Not only did 
the hit song inject vitality into rallies and elevate the mood of 
crowds,8 it also established a cultural touchstone for Baby-
Boomers9 and encapsulated Clinton’s vision of optimism for the 
future.10  Since then, campaign theme songs have become de 
rigueur.11
A. Hitting the Wrong Note 
 
As the use of music has increased, however, so have 
complaints by artists who do not want their songs politicized or 
associated with candidates they do not support.12  A majority of 
complaints have been by performers who favor Democrats and are 
upset about Republicans using their songs;13 some have even 
objected to the use of their songs on television networks that have 
a specific political bent.14
                                                                                                             
7 See Cursio, supra note 
  While some artists object only when 
1, at 317; Dixon, supra note 5; Anne Hull, A Petty Girl? 
Bachmann, You Don’t Know How It Feels, WASH. POST (July 2, 2011), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-07-01/lifestyle/35266860_1_tom-petty-
american-girl-michele-bachmann (Fleetwood Mac endorsed Clinton’s use and performed 
at his inauguration.); see also Richards, supra note 1. 
8 See Matthew F. Jordan, Obama’s iPod: Popular Music and the Perils of 
Postpolitical Populism, 11 POPULAR COMM.: THE INT’L J. MEDIA AND CULTURE 99, 103 
(2013) (music influences emotions and activates a sense of identification with a 
candidate). 
9 See id. at 103–04. 
10 See Cursio, supra note 1, at 317. 
11 See id. at 317–18; see also Tim Dowling, Newt Gingrich Gets a Rocky Ride for 
Campaign Song, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 31, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/shortcuts/2012/jan/31/newt-gingrich-sued-rocky-song; McKinley, supra note 2 
(noting various candidates and their choices for campaign music). 
12 See ,e.g., Dixon, supra note 5 (noting K’Naan’s resistance to Romney using a song 
of his); James Frazier, Liberal Musicians Demand Conservative Pols Stop the Music, 
WASH. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/1/
songwriters-have-history-of-asking-politicians-to-/?page=all. 
13 See Gardner, supra note 1 (explaining that many complaints are by liberal-leaning 
artists against conservative candidates); McKinley, supra note 2 (explaining that 
celebrities seem to favor democrats); Richards, supra note 1 (determining that 80% of 
donations from individuals in the music industry have been to democrats). 
14 See Matthew Perpettua, Adam Levine to Fox News: Stop Playing My Music, 
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 19, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/
adam-levine-to-fox-news-stop-playing-my-music-20111019 (in November 2011, Adam 
Levine of Maroon 5 told FOX News to stop using his band’s music.) 
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their music is used by politicians they do not support, others object 
when it is used in any political context.15  Indeed, in every 
presidential campaign since 1996, at least one candidate has been 
asked to stop playing an artist’s music.16  During recent election 
cycles, Rand Paul,17 Michele Bachmann,18 Mitt Romney,19 and 
Newt Gingrich20 were all chastised by performers for using songs 
without their authorization.21
One of the most publicized incidents involved Representative 
Michele Bachmann.  In her bid for the Republican Presidential 
nomination, Bachmann played a recording of Tom Petty’s 
“American Girl” at several campaign events.
 
22  Presumably, 
Bachmann thought the chorus “she’s an American Girl” evoked 
her All-American quality and defense of mainstream American 
values.23
                                                                                                             
15 Notably, Lee Greenwood does not allow his “God Bless the USA” to be used in 
commercials or political rallies. See Richards, supra note 
  Petty, however, did not approve of Bachmann’s 
1; see also McKinley, supra 
note 2 (noting fear that a song could lose its value if associated with a politician). 
16 See David C. Johnston, The Singer Did Not Approve This Message: Analyzing the 
Unauthorized Use of Copyrighted Music in Political Advertisements in Jackson Browne 
v. John McCain?, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 688–90 (2010).  In 1996, Bob Dole 
modified the lyrics of Isaac Hayes and David Porter’s “Soul Man” into “Dole Man.” See 
id.  George W. Bush used Sting’s “Brand New Day” in 2000 and Orleans’ “Still the One” 
in 2004. See id. at 689.  In 2008, Mike Huckabee used Boston’s “More Than a Feeling,” 
and John McCain used music by Foo Fighters, Jackson Browne, and Survivor. See id. 
17 See Gardner, supra note 1 (music by Rush used during his 2010 senatorial 
campaign). 
18 See Dixon, supra note 5 (noting Tom Petty’s cease and desist request when 
Bachmann used “American Girl”); Frazier, supra note 12 (music by Tom Petty and Katy 
Perry). 
19 See Dixon, supra note 5 (music by K’naan). 
20 See Dowling, supra note 11 (Gingrich was sued for copyright infringement); see 
also Frazier, supra note 12 (Newt Gingrich used both Survivor’s Eye of the Tiger (the 
theme from Rocky III) and the UK band Heavy’s “How You Like Me Now”). 
21 See Dixon, supra note 5; Frazier, supra note 12. 
22 See Dixon, supra note 5; Richards, supra note 1. 
23 See Richards, supra note 1.  Bachmann’s song choice was questionable–aside from 
the refrain, the lyrics described a girl of questionable values quite different from those 
that Bachmann espoused. See Hull, supra note 7.  Rick Perry’s choice of Ozzy 
Osbourne’s “Crazy Train” and Rand Paul’s use of Rush’s “Tom Sawyer” were also odd. 
See Richards, supra note 1. 
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candidacy, and turned this into an opportunity to criticize her for 
not only using the song without permission, but also her politics.24
During the 2008 election, John McCain and the Republican 
National Party were sued by Jackson Browne (an active supporter 
of Barack Obama
 
25) because they included the chorus of “Running 
on Empty” in an advertisement.26  Ultimately, McCain was forced 
to pull the advertisement and settle out of court.27  McCain’s 
running mate, Sarah Palin, experienced a similar problem.  When 
Palin, known in her college basketball days as “Sarah Barracuda,” 
adopted Heart’s “Barracuda” as her introduction at the Republican 
National Convention, Heart complained.28  Heart did not support 
Palin, but also found it ironic that she was using a song that was “a 
rant against the soulless corporate nature of the music business.”29
Even candidates who comply with copyright requirements
 
30 
risk blowback.  Last summer, Republican nominee Mitt Romney 
licensed K’naan’s global hit “Wavin’ Flag.”31  The Somali-
Canadian artist nevertheless objected to Romney’s use and 
released a harshly worded statement detailing his distaste for the 
candidate.32  In response, Romney ceased using the song.33
Music can backfire in other ways, such as when a lyrically 
tone-deaf candidate chooses an inappropriate song.  This most 
famously occurred when President Ronald Reagan referenced what 
he mistakenly thought was the uplifting message of hope in Bruce 
 
                                                                                                             
24 See Dixon, supra note 5; Richards, supra note 1.  Petty also complained when 
George W. Bush used “I Won’t Back Down.” Id. 
25 See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
26 See Maral Vahdani, Selection from the Grammy Foundation Entertainment Law 
Initiative 2010 Writing Competition: Running on Empty: The Problem with Politicians 
and Stealing (Music), 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 75, 76–77 (2011-2012); Frazier, supra 
note 12. 
27 See Vahdani, supra note 26, at 76–77. 
28 See Dowling, supra note 11; Richards, supra note 1. 
29 See Frazier, supra note 12. See generally Dixon, supra note 5; Dowling, supra note 
4. 
30 See Dixon, supra note 5 (public performance rights are usually permitted pursuant to 
a blanket license owned by the venue). 
31 See id. 
32 See Kidd, supra note 4. 
33 See id. 
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Springsteen’s “Born in the USA.”34  Of course, anyone familiar 
with Springsteen’s lyrics knew that the song was nothing of the 
sort, but was, instead, an anti-war anthem criticizing the 
government’s treatment of Vietnam veterans.35  This caused both 
Springsteen to object that Reagan, whom he did not support, was 
co-opting his music and perverting its message, and Reagan’s 
pandering to look foolish.36
Indeed, especially in an era when social media enables 
performers to communicate directly with fans, adopting music 
without the artist’s blessing creates a public opportunity for a 
performer to publicly rebuke the candidate.
 
37  For example, when 
Charlie Crist used David Byrne’s “Road to Nowhere” in his failed 
Senatorial campaign, the settlement required Crist to repent and 
apologize on YouTube.38
B. Performer Complaints 
 
Because artists lack ideological veto power to prevent people 
they dislike from playing their songs,39 they have asserted that a 
political campaign’s use constitutes copyright infringement, 
trademark infringement, or both.  The success of some musical 
artists in stopping campaigns’ unauthorized use of music appears 
to have emboldened others to seek redress.40  Notwithstanding the 
proliferation of these complaints, their legal foundation is 
uncertain.41
                                                                                                             
34 See Cursio, supra note 
  While copyright theories involve clearly defined 
possessory interests and require case-by-case analyses of the facts, 
1, at 318; Frazier, supra note 12; Richards, supra note 1. 
35 See Kidd, supra note 4; Frazier, supra note 12. 
36 See Dixon, supra note 5; Richards, supra note 1. 
37 See Kidd, supra note 4 (noting that once artist goes public, politician may 
experience public backlash); Richards, supra note 1 (indicating that complaints can lead 
to public shaming). 
38 See Kidd, supra note 4 (in concluding his apology, Crist promised: “I pledge that, 
should there be any future election campaigns for me, I will respect and uphold the rights 
of artists and obtain permission or a license for the use of any copyrighted work.”); 
Richards, supra note 1. 
39 See Dixon, supra note 5 (explaining that it is up to the venue holding the political 
rally to purchase a blanket license and there is no other recourse to prevent a song from 
being played for ideological reasons). 
40 See McKinley, supra note 2; see also Frazier, supra note 12. 
41 See Vahdani, supra note 26, at 77; see also Gardner, supra note 1 (explaining that 
courts have not yet answered definitively the issue of unauthorized use). 
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trademark theories implicate emerging legal issues and nuanced 
aspects of trademark that are easily misconstrued and whose 
application to political contexts is unclear.  Additionally, this issue 
not only will continue to arise until it is resolved, but also risks 
diverting a candidate from the campaign trail and into the 
courthouse.42
II. THE RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH A SONG OR SOUND RECORDING 
  Consequently, this Article addresses the latter issue 
of a performer’s trademark interest in songs associated with her 
and whether a political campaign’s use of that music 
impermissibly infringes on those interests. 
To determine whether a campaign’s use of music infringes on 
any rights of a performer, it is necessary to analyze what rights a 
vocalist possesses in a song. This requires clarifying the contours 
of copyright. 
For the most part, the rights related to a tangible song are 
within the purview of copyright.43  A song implicates two different 
copyrights—that of the musical composition, which is possessed 
by the composer or songwriter,44 and that of the sound recording, 
which usually is possessed by the producer or record company.45
The Copyright Act gives a copyright owner a number of 
exclusive rights in a musical work, including the right to perform 
publicly, license, and adapt the work.
 
46
                                                                                                             
42 See Richards, supra note 
  Most sound recording 
copyrights are owned by producers or recording companies that 
1 (noting the diversion of resources and consequent public 
shaming). 
43 See Vahdani, supra note 26, at 77. 
44 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006). 
45 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7). See generally, Jay Rosenthal, The Recording 
Artist/Songwriter Dilemma: The Controlled Composition Clause—Enough Already!, 3 
LANDSLIDE (A.B.A.), no. 4, 2011, available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
landslide_home/intelprop_landslide_VOL3n4.html. 
46 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); see also Vahdani, supra note 26, at 77.  The Sound 
Recording Act of 1971 granted copyright owners of sound recordings limited rights to 
reproduction and distribution but no public performance rights. See Digital Performance 
Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. 
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produced the recording.47  Therefore, a performer of the 
copyrighted work generally does not own any rights in the work, 
her performance, or the tangible recording of that performance.48  
Even when a vocalist authors the copyrighted composition, 
standard industry practice typically requires relinquishment of any 
rights, pursuant to contract.49  Therefore, the copyright holders, 
such as the composer and record company, could claim copyright 
infringement if a sound recording or musical composition is used 
at a campaign rally or in a political ad.50  Indeed, musical artists 
who have successfully sued politicians and commercial entities for 
the unauthorized use of music have done so as copyright owners of 
the musical compositions, not as performers of them.51  By 
contrast, most performers cannot assert such claims when they 
have no rights in the copyrighted works.  Additionally, if a 
politician has licensed the song or sound recording,52 the copyright 
holder cannot claim infringement.53
This has forced vocalists who wish to stop politicians from 
using “their” music to look to other areas of law.  Most recently, 
performers have framed the issue as the song implying a “false 
endorsement,” thereby infringing on a trademark interest.
 
54  
Whereas copyright protects tangible works of authorship (for 
example, a musical composition or sound recording), a trademark 
protects a right appurtenant to an established business or service.55
                                                                                                             
47 See Rosenthal, supra note 
  
Hence, this argument does not assert any copyright in the 
45 (identifying the rights associated with a song and the 
impact of “controlled composition clauses” on musical artists who both write and sing 
their songs). 
48 See Vahdani, supra note 26, at 77. 
49 See Rosenthal, supra note 45. 
50 See Richards, supra note 1. 
51 See generally Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2011). 
52 Music publishing companies, such as BMI and ASCAP, possess the right to license 
the public performance rights of over 6.5 million copyrighted musical compositions. See, 
e.g., Broad. Music Inc. v. Paden, No. 5:11-02199-EJD, 2011 WL 6217414, *1 (N.D. Cal. 
2011). 
53 See 17 U.S.C § 115; Dixon, supra note 5 (where the appropriate license fee has been 
paid, the composer has no claim); McKinley, supra note 2 (copyright licensing fees are 
often paid). 
54 See Gardner, supra note 1. 
55 See Julia Riehm McGufey, The New Edition of New Edition: Boybands, 
Trademarks, and Shifting Goodwill, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 167, 168 (2008). 
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composition or sound recording, but that the sound of a voice 
performing a song, and as captured in the sound recording, 
constitutes an aural mark, or “song mark” as used herein, denoting 
the singer.56  Therefore, when a candidate plays a song that 
constitutes the song mark, it infringes on that trademark by falsely 
implying that the singer endorses or is associated with the 
candidate.57
III. DEFINING TRADEMARK 
  This raises a constellation of novel issues including, 
whether a song could ever constitute a performer trademark; how it 
would impact other rights in the musical work; and whether a use 
by a politician, who is not engaged in commerce, is immune from a 
false endorsement claim. 
A trademark58 is any word, name, symbol, device, or 
combination thereof used to identify and distinguish businesses, 
services, sources, or their goods from those of others.59  A 
trademark both denotes the commercial entity, service, or goods, 
and connotes the qualities, heritage, or goodwill associated with 
it.60  In turn, the trademark guards against consumer confusion 
regarding those goods and services as well as with associations 
between or endorsements by them.61
Trademarks are protected by both federal statute and common 
law; § 32 of the Lanham Act protects federally registered marks
 
62
                                                                                                             
56 See Dixon, supra note 
 
and § 43(a) protects both registered and certain unregistered 
5. 
57 See id. 
58 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2010) (Trademarks are addressed in Title 15 of the 
U.S. Code, the Lanham Act). 
59 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 
U.S. 763, 768 (1992); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 3:1 (4th Ed. 2013) (the mark must be distinctive enough that it is 
capable of distinguishing one source from another). 
60 See Crystal Entm’t & Filmworks v. Jurado, 643 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2011); J. 
Shahar Dillbary, Trademarks as a Media for False Advertising, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 327, 
331–32 (2009); Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the 
Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1385–86 (2011). 
61 See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 763. 
62 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2005). 
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marks.63  The possessory rights of a trademark, however, only 
materialize through actual, bona fide use of a mark in commerce.64
A. A Mark’s Meaning 
 
A wide variety of words, symbols, and devices can be used as 
trademarks.65  The United States Patent and Trademark Office 
even permits registration of distinctive sound marks,66 such as the 
three-chime progression designating NBC.67  The key is that the 
means of denotation, whether aural or visual, must be capable of 
transmitting meaning.68  The mark must be able to identify the 
goods or source or evoke in consumers some connotation of 
quality by which the goods or source is known.69  If the mark does 
not “speak” in this way, it cannot serve as a trademark.70
                                                                                                             
63 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012); see also Crystal Entm’t, 643 F.3d at 1320; Tumblebus 
v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 760–61 (6th Cir. 2005); Gameologist Grp., LLC v. Sci. Games 
Int’l, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 141, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 
64 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  When ownership is asserted under common law, a putative 
owner must show that it has adopted and used the mark in a way that has caused the 
public to associate it with the particular service or source. See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. 
Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1193–94 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Crystal Entm’t, 
643 F.3d at 1320–21 (trademark ownership does not arise from reserving the prerogative 
to use mark in the future, but only from actual, bona fide use in commerce); Int’l 
Healthcare Exch., Inc. v. Global Healthcare Exch., LLC, 470 F. Supp. 2d 365, 371 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The talismanic test is whether or not the mark was used in a way 
sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the marked goods in an appropriate segment 
of the public mind as those of the adopter of the mark.”). 
65 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000); Qualitex 
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). 
66 See In re Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978); 
Daniel R. Bumpus, Bing, Bang, Boom: An Analysis Of In re Vertex Group LLC and the 
Struggle for Inherent Distinctiveness in Sound Marks Made During a Product’s Normal 
Course of Operation, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 245, 248–49 (2011).  According to the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure’s § 
1202.15 Sound Marks: “A sound mark identifies and distinguishes a product or service 
through audio rather than visual means. Sound marks function as source indicators when 
they ‘assume a definitive shape or arrangement’ and ‘create in the hearer’s mind an 
association of the sound’ with a good or service.”  TMEP § 1202.15. (quoting Gen. 
Electric, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 563). 
67 See Bumpus, supra note 66, at 246. 
68 See id. at 249; see also Heymann, supra note 60, at 1385–86 (describing naming and 
denotation function of trademarks). 
69 See Crystal Entm’t, 643 F.3d at 1322; Bell v. Streetwise Records, Ltd., 640 F. Supp. 
575, 581 (D. Mass. 1986); see also Kenneth L. Port, On Nontraditional Trademarks, 38 
N. KY. L. REV. 1, 47 (2011) (explaining that nontraditional marks may prompt association 
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B. A Mark’s Distinctiveness 
A mark must also be distinctive.71  A mark can be distinctive in 
either of two ways.  It can be inherently distinctive72 or acquire 
distinctiveness by developing a secondary meaning.73  A mark is 
inherently distinctive when its intrinsic nature identifies a 
particular source or business.74  This is true of words and marks 
that are “arbitrary” or “fanciful,”75 such as Nestlé or Purell, 
because they “almost automatically tell a customer that they refer 
to a brand.”76  A mark can also acquire distinctiveness when, 
through use in commerce and over time, it develops a secondary 
meaning.77  Secondary meaning is achieved when the public comes 
to understand the mark as identifying the service or product source 
rather than the product itself or a product feature.78
                                                                                                             
in the mind of the consumer between the sound and the brand); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone 
in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 508, 
514 (2008) (research shows that exposure to a mark can trigger emotions in the mind of 
consumers and that consumers transfer feelings about advertising and trademarks to the 
products themselves). 
  If it is not 
reasonable to assume that a consumer would think a mark indicates 
70 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 59, at § 3:1. 
71 See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 
635 (6th Cir. 2002); MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader, No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S 
Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  Whereas inherently distinctive sounds do not 
require proof of acquired distinctiveness, common sounds or sounds made by a product in 
its normal course of operation require proof that the sound has become distinctive in the 
mind of consumers through their use in connection with the manufacturer. See Bumpus, 
supra note 66, at 246–47; In re Vertex Grp. LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1694, 1699 
(T.T.A.B. 2009). 
72 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213–14 (2000). 
73 See id. at 212. 
74 See id. at 215–16; see also G.M.L., Inc. v. Mayhew, 188 F. Supp. 2d 891, 895 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2002) (describing inherently distinctive marks); MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 
2000 Primary Comm. Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004). 
75 See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212. 
76 See id. at 213; Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995) 
(emphasis in original). 
77 See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212; In re Gen. Electric Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (distinguishing inherently distinctive sounds from those 
requiring proof of acquired distinctiveness). 
78 See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213; Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162–63; Inwood Labs., Inc. v. 
Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 (1982). 
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a product source, as opposed to describing a product, product 
feature, or geographic origin, the mark is not distinctive.79
The Supreme Court has stressed that without inherent 
distinctiveness or secondary meaning, there can be no trademark.
 
80  
For example, in Wal-Mart v. Samara Brothers, Wal-Mart 
produced “knock-offs” of the clothing designed and manufactured 
by Samara Brothers.81  Samara Brothers asserted that Wal-Mart’s 
knock-offs infringed on their trade dress.82  The case turned on 
whether product-design trade dress could be inherently distinctive 
so as to function as a trademark.  The Court concluded that unless 
the clothing designs had taken on some secondary meaning83 
transcending their nature as clothes and becoming a “mark” 
designating their manufacturer, they could not be trademarks.84  
The Court also explained that trademark’s “carefully considered 
limitation would be entirely pointless” if an “original” producer 
such as Samara Brothers were permitted to raise this type of 
reverse-passing-off claim.85
With regard to an aural identifier or sound mark, a sound that 
becomes so distinctive that consumers associate it with a source or 
brand (such as NBC’s chimes) can possess secondary meaning, 
and can thus be trademarked.
 
86  By contrast, a sound that a product 
makes in its normal course of operation, such as the beep of a cell 
phone, or is heard in another context cannot possess secondary 
meaning and cannot be trademarked.87
                                                                                                             
79 See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213. 
 
80 See id. at 212. (noting that only “over time” could color, for example, come to be 
seen as signifying a brand). 
81 Id. at 207–08. 
82 Id. at 208–09. 
83 Id. at 211. 
84 Id. at 216. 
85 This would create a conundrum where a trademark owner who was not identified 
could raise an infringement claim, but if it was accurately identified, it could raise a false 
endorsement claim. 
86 See Bumpus, supra note 66, at 246; see also In re Gen. Electric Broad. Co., 199 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (where the PTO explained that “a sound mark 
depends upon aural perception of the listener . . . [so] when heard [it is] associated with 
the source or event . . . .”) 
87 See In re Vertex Grp., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1694,1699; Bumpus, supra note 66, at 
246–47. 
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IV. CONSTRUCTING A THEORY OF SONG MARK PROTECTION 
A. Music as an Entertainment Service or Brand Quality 
The threshold issue in a singer aural trademark claim is 
whether a song can be registered as a trademark designating the 
vocal performer.88  If it cannot be, then there is no protectable 
trademark, and there can be no trademark infringement.89  
Although courts have not addressed song mark claims in politics, a 
few have considered song-based trademark claims in commercial 
contexts.90
A trademark cannot exist in the abstract, but obtains meaning 
only in relation to that which that it designates.
  This jurisprudence is a necessary starting point. 
91  Therefore, 
before there can be a trademark, there must be a service or 
business to mark.92  To illustrate, a few years after Cab Calloway’s 
death, Christopher Brooks formed “The Cab Calloway Orchestra” 
which honored Calloway’s musical legacy by performing vintage 
Calloway songs using their original arrangements.93  Calloway’s 
relatives sued Brooks, alleging that his use of “Cab Calloway” 
constituted trademark infringement.94
The Second Circuit explained that “a trademark is merely a 
symbol of goodwill and cannot be sold or assigned apart from the 
goodwill it symbolizes.”
 
95  Because goodwill is inseparable from 
the underlying business that it denotes, trademark rights cannot be 
transferred apart from an ongoing business.96
                                                                                                             
88 See Leelanau Wine Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., 502 F.3d 504, 513 (6th Cir. 
2007) (noting that registration of a trademark creates a rebuttable presumption of 
validity). 
  Though 
“entertainment” services could be indicated by a service mark, at 
89 See id. at 512–13; Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 760–61 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
90 See G.M.L., Inc. v. Mayhew, 188 F. Supp. 2d 891, 895 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). 
91 See EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmuplos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 
62 (2d Cir. 2000). 
92 See Bumpus, supra note 66, at 251. 
93 Creative Arts by Calloway v. Brooks, 48 F. App’x. 16, 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
94 Id. at 17. 
95 Id. at 17–18. 
96 See id.; Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984) (“There are no rights in 
a trademark apart from the business with which the mark has been associated; they are 
inseparable.”). 
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the time of his death, Calloway was not operating as such.97  As a 
result, there was no entertainment service to mark, and, thus, no 
trademark in “Cab Callaway” to transfer. 98 Consequently, there 
was no trademark on which to infringe.99
Other courts, however, have permitted the names of musical 
groups to be transferred by contract and trademarked.
 
100  Indeed, 
both musical groups ABBA and New Edition have prevailed in 
actions to trademark their names.101  In the latter, New Edition’s 
former manager attempted to reconstitute a new version of the 
singing group under the name “New Edition.”102  The original 
members of the group objected, claiming that they owned the mark 
“New Edition.”103  Because neither could assert senior ownership 
of the mark, ownership rested on ascertaining what audiences 
understood “New Edition” to designate and determining who 
controlled those qualities.104  The court found that “New Edition” 
stood for “first and foremost the [unique combination of singers] 
with their distinctive personalities and style as performers.”105  
Because the original members controlled those characteristics, the 
court awarded them ownership of the trademark.106
                                                                                                             
97 Calloway, 48 Fed. Appx. at 17–18. 
 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 18. 
100 A band name is sometimes deemed a service mark because it promotes 
entertainment services. See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(“Entertainment” may be considered a service in connection with the law of service 
marks); McGufey, supra note 55, at 170; see also Crystal Entm’t & Filmworks v. Jurado, 
643 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing ownership of and trademark rights 
associated with the singing group Exposé); In re Polar Music Int’l AB, 714 F.2d 1567, 
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 59, at § 16:45.  The mark or name 
designates both a service as well as the particular combination of performers that cannot 
otherwise be expressed. See Matthew D. Bunker, You Can’t Handle the Truth (in Music): 
Does the Lanham Act Preempt State “Truth in Music” Laws?, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 
12–13 (2011). 
101 See Polar Music, 714 F.2d at 1571–72 (the corporate entity submitted a license 
evidencing its right to control the quality of the musical group’s sound recordings, 
thereby demonstrating that it controlled the quality of the sound recordings); Bell v. 
Streetwise Records, Ltd., 640 F. Supp. 575, 580–82 (D. Mass. 1986). 
102 Bell, 640 F. Supp. at 581. 
103 Id. at 580–81. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 581–82. 
106 Id. at 580–82; see also Crystal Entm’t & Filmworks v. Jurado, 643 F.3d 1313,1322–
23 (11th Cir. 2011) (the entity claiming ownership of the trademark Exposé failed to 
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Applying this to a song mark, to the extent that a performer 
provides entertainment services, she could designate those services 
by a trademark.  That mark, however, would designate only the 
commercial musical or vocal services.  It would not be a personal 
alias equivalent to the performer independent of those services,107 
and the performer would not own the song or have an exclusive 
right to use it as a mark in connection with other services.108
B. The “Mark” of a Song Mark 
 
Next, that which is proffered as the song mark must be among 
the words, sounds, or combination thereof that can be registered as 
a mark.  The theory of a song mark is that the sound of a singer’s 
voice performing the musical composition and captured in a sound 
recording functions as a mark designating the performer.109
C. Voice or Vocal Performance 
  The 
proposed song mark, therefore, is a hybrid of: the foundational 
musical composition, the singer’s vocal performance of it, the 
instrumental performances; and the sound recording containing 
these, as mixed by the producer.  Each of these elements is 
discussed below. 
With regard to whether voice can be a signifier, it could be 
thought of as a sound.  As noted, distinctive sounds and aural 
signifiers able to evoke a source or service can be registered as 
sound marks.110
                                                                                                             
prove control over the singing group’s qualities, scheduling of performances, and 
management); New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 304 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
  A few California courts have protected a 
distinctive human voice as a trademark where it is a widely known 
107 See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922–23 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(rejecting Tiger Woods’ claim that he, as a person, can be trademarked); Pirone v. 
MacMillian, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 582–84 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that Babe Ruth pictures 
are not entitled to trademark protection unless they serve an “origin-indicating function”). 
108 See Gameologist Grp., LLC v. Sci. Games Int’l, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 141,153  
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that rights to a trademark extend only to the goods and services 
noted in a registration certificate). 
109 See Bumpus, supra note 66, at 262. 
110 See In re Vertex Grp., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1694, 1699 (T.T.A.B. 2009); In re 
Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (sound must be 
distinctive and evoke in consumers an association with the business); Bumpus, supra 
note 66, at 246. 
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indicator of the vocalist’s identity.111  Indeed, both Tom Waits and 
Bette Midler have prevailed in actions to protect their voices as 
unregistered commercial trademarks of their respective vocal 
identities.112
The Third Circuit has also embraced the notion that voice 
could indicate the services of a person famous for voice work.
 
113  
During his storied career, sports announcer John Facenda narrated 
a number of NFL Films productions.114  Facenda’s deep baritone 
had been described as “distinctive,” “recognizable,” and known by 
many football fans as “the Voice of God.”115  Years after his death, 
NFL Films used portions of his voice-overs in a television 
documentary entitled “The Making of Madden NFL 06.”116  
Facenda’s Estate sued NFL Films for trademark infringement, 
claiming that using “sound samples” of Facenda’s voice falsely 
implied that Facenda endorsed the video game.117  For purposes of 
ruling on the NFL’s motion to dismiss, the court treated Facenda’s 
voice as a trademark.118
It is important to keep in mind that these decisions did not 
grant the performer a trademark in a song, but allowed an 
established commercial service to be marked with a distinctive 
sound (voice) recognized by the public as designating that 
 
                                                                                                             
111 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford 
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462–63 (9th Cir. 1988) (if voice is sufficient indicia of a 
celebrity’s identity, it can be an unregistered trademark); see also Facenda v. NFL Films, 
542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding a trademark claim because Facenda’s 
voice was considered a distinctive mark); David Tan, Much Ado About Evocation: A 
Cultural Analysis of “Well-Knownness” and the Right of Publicity, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 317, 330–31 (2010). 
112 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110 (“A false endorsement claim based on the unauthorized use 
of a celebrity’s identity is a type of false association claim, for it alleges the misuse of a 
trademark, i.e., a symbol or device such as a visual likeness, vocal imitation, or other 
uniquely distinguishing characteristic . . . .”); Midler, 849 F.2d at 463–64. 
113 Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1013. 
114 Id. at 1011. 
115 Id. at 1011–12.  In fact, NFL Films had released works featuring what it called “the 
Legendary Voice of John Facenda.”  Id. at 1012. 
116 Id. at 1011. 
117 Id. at 1011, 1014.  The NFL asserted that its copyright in the original NFL Films 
productions gave it the right to use the soundtracks of those productions in any way they 
wished. Id. at 1013. 
118 Id. at 1014. 
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performer’s services.  Furthermore, although a unique voice like 
Facenda’s or Waits’s, recognizable independent of context or the 
foundational copyrighted work, can serve as a mark, it does not 
mean that most voices can.  These plaintiffs were well-known 
vocal performers119 with unique vocal qualities.  Yet, with 
“Autotune” and contemporary production techniques, today’s 
singers are often indistinguishable or recognized in relation to a 
record rather than due to some unusual vocal quality.  Therefore, 
voice alone is not presumptively distinct, and even when it is, that 
does not prove audience recognition.120  Furthermore, the concept 
of identity is not boundless.  Even courts that construe identity 
broadly require that it be used conspicuously, either by directly 
using the trademarked name or image or by emphasizing its iconic 
symbols.121  It is questionable whether merely including a singer’s 
voice or playing a record meets this standard of a conspicuous use 
of the performer’s identity.122
D. The Musical Composition and Sound Recording 
 
A song mark is more than the sound of a distinctive, 
recognizable voice—it also includes the vocal performance of the 
copyrighted musical work, the instrumental performances, mixing 
and production techniques, and the resulting sound recording.123
A musical composition or record might be likened to a long 
jingle.  Courts have acknowledged that a musical “jingle” can 
 
                                                                                                             
119 See Tan, supra note 111 at 341–43, 349, (asserting that a celebrity must establish 
“well-known-ness” by a substantial portion of the public). 
120 See White v. Samsung, 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (claims are often made by people with an exaggerated sense of their fame and 
pop culture significance). 
121 See Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t., No. 3:12-cv-535, 2013 WL 
2156318, at *10 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2013) (“[T]he defendant’s work must make some 
affirmative statement of the plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement, beyond the mere use 
of plaintiff’s name or other characteristic”); Arenas v. Shed Media, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 
1189 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see also Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 829, 
838  (S.D. Ind. 2011). 
122 See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that 
the mere use of the record including her voice would not, alone, amount to use of 
identity). 
123 See Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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function as a brand identifier or trademark.124
This proposition, however, rests on the premise that a musical 
composition or sound recording is nothing more than a mere jingle.  
This draws a false equivalency.  Although virtually every jingle is 
a musical composition, most musical compositions are not jingles.  
A jingle is limited, not only in length, but also in its character and 
purpose.
  Therefore, if a vocal 
sound and a jingle can each be trademarked, then, perhaps, a 
singer’s vocal sound heard in a sound recording (essentially a long 
jingle) could be combined and trademarked as a song mark. 
125  At its inception, a jingle is conceived to be an aural 
logo of a brand,126 and nothing more.  There is no intent to sell it 
on iTunes or remix it as a dance recording.  Instead, a jingle is used 
in a brand’s advertisements to evoke a commercial impression.127
A musical work possesses an entirely different character, and 
does not alone produce a commercial impression.
  
Once cultivated, it is understood by consumers to function 
exclusively in this way. 
128  Songs and 
sound recordings are not intended as aural means to connote brand 
qualities.  Rather, music is a creative expression and an end 
product—it is meant to be heard, enjoyed, critiqued, and purchased 
as music.129
                                                                                                             
124 See id.; Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761 (D.N.J. 2011) (noting that 
college “fight songs” are licensed pursuant to trademark); Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. 
Supp. 2d 1144, 1167–68 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (analyzing jurisprudence and concluding that 
musical compositions are generally worthy of trademark protection, as they could 
become associated with a particular product); G.M.L. v. Mayhew, 188 F. Supp. 2d 891, 
893 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). 
   Audiences listen to music to mend broken hearts, 
celebrate, unwind, or energize a workout, not to differentiate 
among commercial sources.  When viewers hear a Lady Gaga song 
during The Weather Channel’s “Local on the 8s,” they do not 
125 See Henley, 733 F. Supp. at 1151. 
126 See G.M.L., 188 F. Supp. at 896. 
127 See id. at 895. 
128 See id. at 896; see also EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmuplos 
Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that musical composition cannot be a 
trademark for itself). 
129 See EMI, 228 F.3d at 64 (noting that a musical composition cannot serve as a 
trademark because it is copyrighted musical work); G.M.L., 188 F. Supp. at 896 
(explaining that a musical composition or sound recording is not a designation of source 
but a good itself). 
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presume that the song designates winter weather, is a jingle of the 
network, or represents Lady Gaga’s endorsement of either.130
E. Performance of a Musical Work 
 
Because audiences understand a song as a creative work rather 
than as a commercial signifier, a song cannot signify itself.131  The 
only function it could have would be to signify itself as music.132  
This is consistent with how courts have interpreted trademark 
claims involving music.  In rejecting such claims by singers, courts 
have held that a “signature performance” cannot create a 
trademark.133
The first in this line of cases involved the 1960s hit song “The 
Girl from Ipanema.”
 
134   In 1964, singer Astrud Gilberto recorded 
“The Girl from Ipanema.”135  It launched her career, won her a 
Grammy Award, and became a signature song that she performed 
frequently thereafter.136  Decades later, Frito-Lay licensed the 
record from the copyright owner and used it in a television 
advertisement.137
                                                                                                             
130 130 Furthermore, usually any meaning a listener assigns to a song is derived from its 
lyrics (as Regan did).  The lyrics are the literal message of the creative work, not 
secondary to it. 
  Gilberto, however, claimed that her frequent 
performances of “The Girl from Ipanema” had caused the public to 
131 See EMI, 228 F.3d at 64 (“[A] musical composition cannot be protected as its own 
trademark under the Lanham Act  . . .  cases involving trademark infringement should be 
those alleging the appropriation of symbols or devices that identify the composition or its 
source, not the appropriation or copying or imitation of the composition itself.”). 
132 See id.; G.M.L., 188 F. Supp. at 896. 
133 See Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2011) (indicating that a 
performance does not give singer rights in the recording of “signature performances”); 
L.A. Triumph, Inc. v. Ciccone, No. CV 10-06195 SJO (JCx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
132057, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011) (noting that the performance of a song does not 
bestow on the performer a trademark); Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1167–
68 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (highlighting that a performer cannot possess a trademark in a 
performance of a musical composition); Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 
1059 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (explaining that performing artists cannot possess a trademark in a 
performance of song). 
134 Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 59. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 58–59. 
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identify her with the song, making it her trademark.138  She thus 
claimed that Frito Lay’s use infringed on her trademark and was 
likely to deceive consumers about her affiliation with the Frito-Lay 
brand or her approval of its products.139
Although the Second Circuit accepted the proposition that a 
jingle could be a trademark,
 
140 it rejected Gilberto’s contention that 
a performance of a composition could mature into an unregistered 
trademark.141   Instead, it held that the performance of a musical 
composition could not serve as a trademark for itself, so Gilberto 
could not possess a trademark of the song.142  Speaking to the issue 
of song-based trademarks more broadly, the court warned that 
granting a song the status of trademark would give performers a 
previously unknown right that would alter the commercial world’s 
understanding of the scope of trademark and profoundly disrupt 
commerce.143  Indeed, it would enable performers and copyright 
authors to license works and then turn around and sue licensees for 
trademark infringement.144
Other courts have concurred that the performance of a song 
cannot be leveraged into a singer trademark.
 
145
                                                                                                             
138 Id.  Indeed, she asserted that the public thought of her as the girl from Ipanema. Id. 
at 59. 
  A few years ago, 
139 Id. at 57–58. 
140 Id. at 61. 
141 Id. at 62–63. 
142 Id. at 62; see also Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 712 (9th 
Cir. 1970) (rejecting singer Nancy Sinatra’s claim that the song had been so popularized 
by her, “that her name is identified with it” and it had acquired a secondary meaning).  In 
Oliveira, the court added that no reasonable fact-finder could find that the audience 
would believe the song constituted an endorsement by her. Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 60. 
143 Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62–63.  As the EMI court noted: 
Concluding that a song can serve as an identifying mark of the song 
itself would stretch the definition of trademark—and the protection 
afforded under § 43(a)—too far and give trademark law a role in 
protecting the very essence of the song, an unwarranted extension 
into an area already protected by copyright law. 
EMI Catalogue P’Ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmuplos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 64 (2d 
Cir. 2000). 
144 See Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 63. 
145 See L.A. Triumph, Inc. v. Ciccone, No. CV 10-06195 SJO (JCx), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 132057, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011); Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 
1144, 1167–68 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059 
(C.D. Cal. 2004). 
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Madonna sought to trademark “Material Girl” to identify her 
women’s clothing line.146  Another women’s clothing 
manufacturer that previously had used “Material Girl” as its 
trademark, objected to her registration.147  Madonna moved to 
dismiss, asserting that she was the senior owner of the trademark 
“Material Girl,”148 by virtue of having performed and been in the 
video of the song “Material Girl” in the 1980s.149  In denying the 
motion, the court explained that since a singer cannot create a 
trademark by performing a song,150 Madonna could not have 
earned the trademark “Material Girl” by singing it.151
The result is no different when the performer also authors the 
copyrighted composition on which the trademark is based—
copyright might be implicated, but trademark is not.  For example, 
Digable Planets accused Target of copyright and trademark 
infringement for using the lyrics and sound recording of its 
signature song “Rebirth of Slick (Cool like Dat)”
 
152 in a print, in-
store ad campaign. 153  Although the court permitted Digable 
Planets’ copyright infringement claim based on the use of the 
alteration of the song’s lyrics, it dismissed the trademark claim, 
stating that a trademark cannot arise from a performance.154
Singer-songwriter Don Henley was similarly rebuffed when he 
complained that his music was used in political ads of a candidate 
 
                                                                                                             
146 Ciccone, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132057, at *6–7. 
147 Id. (the “first to use a mark is deemed the ‘senior’ user and has the right to enjoin 
‘junior’ users from using confusingly similar marks in the same industry and 
market . . . .”) (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 
1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999)).  In Ciccone, the manufacturer had used the name “Material 
Girl” under a California trademark that had expired. Id. at *2. 
148 Id. at *6–7. 
149 Id.; cf. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 712 (9th Cir. 1970) 
(Sinatra claimed that because she popularized a song, her name was identified with it). 
150 Because Madonna could not have owned the trademark from her musical 
performance, she could not prove that she was the owner or senior user of the mark 
“Material Girl,” over the clothing manufacturer. Ciccone, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
132057, at *6–7. 
151 Id. at *7. 
152 Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
153 Id. at 1059.  The advertising campaign featured altered versions of the song with 
slogans such as “Jeans Like That,” “Denim Like That,” and “Shoes Like That.”  Id. at 
1054. 
154 Id. at 1059–60. 
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he did not support.155  There, Republican candidate Charles 
Devore156 had seen an Obama sticker on a Toyota Prius, which 
reminded him of the “DEADHEAD sticker on a Cadillac” lyric in 
Henley’s “Boys of Summer.”157  This inspired Devore to write a 
campaign song entitled “The Hope of November.”  “The Hope of 
November” followed the melody of “The Boys of Summer” but 
made fun of Barack Obama and Nancy Pelosi.158  Next, DeVore 
wrote “All She Wants to Do is Tax” which used the melody of 
“All She Wants to Do Is Dance” but inserted lyrics criticizing 
Barbara Boxer.159  DeVore’s campaign team then recorded the new 
lyrics to karaoke tracks of the Henley songs and used their new 
versions in two campaign ads and YouTube videos.160
Henley, the singer and copyright owner of the tunes, sued 
DeVore for both copyright and trademark infringement.
 
161   The 
court permitted his copyright claims, but dismissed his trademark 
claims.162  It explained that since a performance of a copyrighted 
work cannot vest in a performer a trademark, the unauthorized use 
of a copyrighted work could not violate any trademark of the 
performer.163  The court added that since it was clear that Henley 
was not singing the song, the public would not have mistakenly 
believed that he was associated with the candidate.164
F. Can a Song Attain Secondary Meaning? 
 
In rejecting song trademark claims, courts have explained that 
a musical composition or sound recording cannot be a trademark of 
itself.165
                                                                                                             
155 Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
  That a performance of a song cannot function as a 
trademark indicating the song, however, does not foreclose the 
possibility that it could function as a trademark indicating 
something else.  After all, a jingle does not designate its musical 
156 Devore was a California Assembly member at the time. Id. at 1148. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 1149. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 1169. 
163 Id. at 1167. 
164 Id. at 1168. 
165 See generally Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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notes or singer, but the commercial entity, service, or brand with 
which it is associated.166
To function in this way, the song would need to transcend the 
creative work and achieve secondary meaning.
  Obviously, a vocalist asserting a song 
mark is not claiming that her performance included in the sound 
recording designates the song, but that it denotes her as a singer.  
Therefore, just as a jingle indicates a brand, the song mark plus her 
voice would be a jingle indicating the singer. 
167
First, a sound that a product makes in the normal course of its 
operation or to which listeners have been exposed under different 
circumstances lacks inherent distinctiveness, so cannot be 
trademarked.
  In other words, 
when the audience heard the song, it must automatically think of 
the singer’s entertainment services, not the music or lyrics of the 
creative work.  For a number of reasons, it is doubtful that a song 
can shed its inherent nature as a creative work and acquire an 
unrelated secondary meaning. 
168  Because a singer (albeit through voice) performs 
the notes and lyrics that the composition tells it to, or that the 
producer has mixed into the sound recording, the voice is merely 
making the sounds “made” in the normal course of performing the 
composition or playing the record.  It, therefore, has no secondary 
meaning.169
Second, any more precise meaning that a song has to listeners 
is based on its lyrics.  Yet, this is literally the meaning of or 
communicated by the creative work, not distinct from it.  For 
example, it was the up-tempo chorus of “Born in the USA” that 
caused President Regan to conclude that the song celebrated being 
  In fact, if the song could be used as a commercial 
indicator, it is more reasonable that it would inure to either the 
composer who wrote and licensed it or the record company that 
produced and marketed the recording. 
                                                                                                             
166 See supra note 126. 
167 See Bumpus, supra note 66, at 246; Port, supra note 69, at 47. 
168 See Nextel Commc’ns., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1393, 1404 (T.T.A.B 
2009) (asserting that the “chirp” of cell phone cannot be trademarked because it is a 
sound in the normal course of the product’s operation); In Re Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 
U.S.P.Q (BNA) 560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978). 
169 Additionally, listeners would initially become familiar with the song in something 
other than a commercial context, such as a song on the radio or iTunes. 
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an American, and to use it to underscore his pro-USA point.170  In 
a similar vein, when Michelle Bachmann appeared on Late Night 
with Jimmy Fallon, The Roots played “Lyin’ Ass Bitch” as her 
introduction.171  Listeners who recognized the song deduced that 
the band was communicating its negative opinion of Bachmann. 172  
In fact, Bachmann supporters complained and the show later 
apologized for the song choice due to its title and lyrics.  
Additionally, any message was imputed to The Roots who played 
the song, not its original singer.173  Again, that meaning is not 
secondary to or different from the lyrics, but a literal translation.174
Finally, even if the song achieved secondary meaning, the 
public would not necessarily presume that it designated the 
commercial services of the vocalist.  If the song became popular in 
conjunction with a brand advertisement, movie, or fictional 
product in a television show,
 
175
                                                                                                             
170 See Frazier, supra note 
 the audience would associate it 
with those.  Indeed, this is how a jingle operates.  For example, the 
song “Bad Things to You” is known as the theme song to HBO’s 
show True Blood.  If True Blood fans hear “Bad Things to You,” it 
is far more likely that they would think of the TV show than singer 
Jace Everret’s entertainment services.  As such, the song’s 
secondary meaning would be the musical identifier of True Blood. 
12. 
171 See Russell Goldman, Jimmy Fallon Drummer Calls Bachmann ‘Bitch’ Song 
‘Tongue in Cheek’, ABC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2011, 4:37 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/
blogs/politics/2011/11/jimmy-fallons-drummer-grounded-for-bachmanns-bitch-song. 
172 See id.  This was an easy presumption considering that Questlove’s Twitter avatar 
was a photo of him hugging President Obama. 
173 See id. 
174 It follows that when an audience at a Michele Bachmann campaign event hears 
“American Girl,” it simply enjoys the song or relates its lyrics to Bachmann as “an 
American girl,” rather than deducing that Tom Petty endorses Bachmann. 
175 For example, Breaking Bad’s Emmy-nominated episode included a brilliant, 
memorable montage to the 1969 song “Crystal Blue Persuasion.”  Whereas college-aged 
fans of Breaking Bad associate the song with Heisenberg’s blue crystal meth, singer 
Tommy James understands the song to reflect his conversion to Christianity. Interview by 
Shawna Hansen Ortega with Tommy James (Sept. 15, 2009).  Hence, the respective 
cohorts and context would impact the audience’s understanding of the song. 
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V. TRADEMARKS FOUNDED ON COPYRIGHTED WORKS 
Assuming that a song mark could exist (and aside from any 
issue of preemption discussed below), it is doubtful that a 
trademark could be registered “on” another party’s copyrighted 
work.176  As noted, a song mark is comprised of the copyrighted 
musical composition and the sound recording that mixes the vocal 
and instrumental performances.  Dastar instructs that when a 
trademark is asserted over a copyrightable work, the copyrighted 
work is the base point for analysis.177
Although the Copyright Act awards the copyright owner of the 
composition and, to a lesser extent, the sound recording the right to 
control its use, performance, and distribution, including whether to 
withhold it or make it available,
 
178 it does not give a performer any 
such rights; performing a copyrighted work pursuant to permission 
is not a mechanism to convert a third party’s copyrighted work into 
a trademark. 179  Hence, the actor does not earn a right in a movie 
by emoting in it, a singer does not realize a right in a song by 
singing it, and a musician does not obtain a right in a musical score 
by playing it.  Rather, these performances are permitted only by 
copyright and, once captured in a tangible medium, are subsumed 
by copyright.180  If it were otherwise, a song mark would enable a 
singer to control the composition, thereby extinguishing the rights 
granted by the Copyright Act.181
                                                                                                             
176 Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned against over-extending trademark into 
areas traditionally occupied by copyright. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 
539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 
(2001). 
  Accordingly, a vocalist 
177 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35 (“Without a copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word 
“origin” has no discernible limits.”).  Much like a song mark that rests on a copyrighted 
work, the trademark infringement claim in Dastar was premised on a work whose 
copyright had expired. 
178 See Vahdani, supra note 24, at 77. 
179 See generally Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34; TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29 (explaining that the 
Lanham Act should not be extended to cover areas that are traditionally the concern of 
copyright). 
180 See Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 650–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
181 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 119(b) (2010) (discussing compulsory licenses); 17 U.S.C. § 
114(b) (2010). 
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trademark could not be premised on someone else’s copyrighted 
work.182
For example, in Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire,
 
183 singer Nancy 
Sinatra claimed that her hit single “These Boots Are Made for 
Walking” had taken on a secondary meaning, becoming hers.184  
Sinatra was disabused of this notion when she unsuccessfully sued 
Goodyear Tire for using the composition in an advertisement.185  
Goodyear licensed the composition from the copyright owners, had 
other performers cover it, and included the new version in a 
commercial.186  Sinatra insisted that because it was her signature 
song, Goodyear could not use the composition without her 
permission.  In rejecting her claim, the court explained that the 
song that made Sinatra famous was not hers, had never been hers, 
and gave her no rights.187  Rather, she presumably had obtained 
permission from of the copyright owner to record it  and had she 
wanted to prevent anyone else from ever using it so that she could 
cultivate secondary meaning, she could have purchased those 
rights.188
The same is true of performances memorialized in other types 
of copyrighted media.  In Fleet v. CBS, CBS purchased the 
exclusive rights to distribute a movie in which the plaintiff actors 
appeared.
 
189   The third party producers of the film, however, had 
failed to pay the actors’ salaries.190
                                                                                                             
182 See EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmuplos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 
64 (2d Cir. 2000).  If a musical composition could be protected as its own trademark, any 
copyright claim for infringement of rights in a musical composition would be converted 
automatically into a Lanham Act cause of action.  In theory, a singer might trademark a 
replicable sound or create a jingle to designate their entertainment services or other 
commercial pursuit, but the singer trademark could not co-opt a copyrighted work. See id. 
  Unable to obtain payment 
from the movie’s producers, the actors sued CBS alleging that 
airing the film—which included their likenesses—violated their 
183 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970). 
184 Id. at 711–12. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 711. 
187 Id. at 716. 
188 Id. 
189 Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 645, 650–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
190 Id. at 647. 
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right of publicity.191  In holding the claim preempted,192 the court 
observed that it was not merely the plaintiffs’ likenesses that were 
captured on film, but their dramatic performances of the 
copyrighted work.193  Once these were captured on film, “they 
became ‘dramatic work[s]’ ‘fixed in [a] tangible medium of 
expression . . . .”194
Permitting a performer to wield a song trademark would create 
a “mutant species” of copyright.
 
195  Because copyrights have a 
limited life span,196 but trademarks can be renewed,197 an owner of 
a song mark would possess a perpetual monopoly over a 
copyrighted sound recording and composition.  Yet, such a 
perpetual copyright is forbidden by the Copyright Act and is 
unconstitutional.198  Additionally, there is evidence that Congress 
did not overlook the reputational interests of singers, but declined 
to protect them under Trademark law.  For example, under the 
Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA),199 an author of a work of visual 
art can prevent the use of her name as the creator of a work that 
she did not create or when her work has been modified in a way 
that “would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.”200  
Congress did not extend this protection to performers and even 
VARA grants a relatively narrow right that does not give artists the 
power to guard against unwanted associations.201
                                                                                                             
191 Id. 
  Additionally, § 
192 Id. at 646. 
193 Id. at 651. 
194 Id. at 650 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
195 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003).  In Oliveira v. 
Frito-Lay, Inc. the court presumed that if there were a trademark in a song, it would be 
owned by the copyright owner. Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(explaining that the composer might license the use under copyright, and then turn around 
and sue under trademark). 
196 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33–35. 
197 See Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
198 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. Further complicating the concept of a song mark is that it 
would be tied to the acts of third parties.  Presumably, if a song was not played by a DJ or 
was a hit, it would not insinuate itself into the public’s psyche and, thus, could not 
materialize into a protectable mark. 
199 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
200 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (A)(a)(1), (2), (3)(A) (2002). 
201 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (A).  In fact, § 115 provides for a compulsory license for 
musical compositions: as long as the licensee complies with the statute, a copyright 
owner cannot prevent a third party from using or covering the copyrighted composition.  
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115 of the Copyright Act provides for a compulsory license for 
musical compositions—as long as the licensee complies with the 
statute, a copyright owner cannot prevent a third party from using 
or covering the copyrighted composition.202  If the author or 
copyright owner of the composition cannot prevent someone from 
using the work pursuant to a compulsory license, it makes no sense 
that a mere performer of that work could be able to do so.  Indeed, 
Dastar’s trademark infringement claim rested on a work whose 
copyright had expired.  Nevertheless, the Court rejected it, because 
it would “cause[] the Lanham Act to conflict with the law of 
copyright.”203  If a trademark cannot be founded on an expired 
copyright work, a trademark cannot reasonably be erected on an 
existing copyrighted work.204
VI. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
 
Assuming, arguendo, that a song mark can exist, a campaign’s 
using of the mark, that is, playing a song, without more, does not 
constitute infringement.  Although the Lanham Act grants a 
trademark owner a number of exclusive rights, it does not grant her 
a right to control all uses of a mark.205  To the contrary, anyone 
may use a trademark or benefit from its goodwill if there is no 
secondary significance206  or commercial activity implicated.207
                                                                                                             
17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 114(b) (2010).  If the author or copyright owner of the composition 
cannot prevent someone from using the work pursuant to a compulsory license, it makes 
no sense that a mere performer of that work could be able to do so. 
 
202 17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 114(b). 
203 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003). 
204 See d. at 34 (doing so would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the 
public’s “federal right to ‘copy and to use,’ expired copyrights.”). 
205 See id. (the Lanham Act grants a trademark owner a number of exclusive rights, but 
these rights are more circumscribed than those of copyright. Courts must not over-extend 
trademark into areas traditionally occupied by copyright); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. 
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001). 
206 See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29; Two Pesos Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 767–68 
(1992). 
207 See Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 695 
(6th Cir. 2003) (trademark infringement does not apply when a trademark is used in a 
“non-trademark” way); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 
307 (9th Cir. 1992) (infringement laws “simply do not apply” to a “non-trademark use of 
a mark”); 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, § 22:25 (4th ed. 2013) (noting that one who uses the 
30 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:1 
 
Additionally: 
There is a distinction between the rights that flow 
from ownership, most notably the exclusive right to 
use the registered mark in commerce, and the 
remedies—including an owner’s right to enjoin 
another person’s use of a mark—that ripen only 
when there is . . . a likelihood of confusion.208
Thus, reflecting the semiotic and prophylactic functions of 
trademark, a trademark owner has a right to protect the accrued 
value of the mark and prevent the misperception that it sources, 
provides, is associated with, or sponsors a service or a product.
 
209  
Therefore, the use of a trademark infringes only if it misleads 
consumers into believing that the trademark owner manufactures, 
provides, sponsors, or is affiliated with the defendant’s service, 
business, or products.210  Even then, trademark infringement 
protects against only mistaken consumer decisions or commercial 
matters,211 but not confusion generally.212
A. Types of Infringement 
 
Trademark infringement takes different forms.  The most 
common type is when a competitor uses a trademark to palm off 
counterfeit goods or services,213
                                                                                                             
trademarked product, but does not engage in commercial activities, is not a trademark 
infringer); see also Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 3:12-CV-535, 2013 
WL 2156318, at *12 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2013). 
 thereby confusing consumers 
208 What-A-Burger of Va., Inc. v. Whataburger, Inc. of Corpus Christi, Tex., 357 F.3d 
441, 452 (4th Cir. 2004). 
209 See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773; Crystal Entm’t & Filmworks v. Jurado, 643 F.3d 
1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011). 
210 See Fortres Grand, 2013 WL 2156318, at *6; MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader, No. 00 
Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004). 
211 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 32–33 (2003); Fortres 
Grand, 2013 WL 2156318, at *6. 
212 See Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1214 (9th Cir. 2012); 
Fortres Grand, 2013 WL 2156318, at *9; MasterCard, 2004 U.S Dist. LEXIS 3644, at 
*10; Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 689 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
213 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26 n.1 (palming off is when a producer misrepresents her 
goods or services as someone else’s; reverse passing off is when the producer 
misrepresents someone else’s goods or services as her own.) 
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regarding their source.214  This type of infringement requires proof 
that consumers were actually confused.215
A second type of infringement, pertinent here, is false 
endorsement.
 
216  Under § 1125(a)(1),217
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any 
goods or services [ . . . ] uses in commerce any 
[trademark] that— 
 a trademark owner can 
bring an action for trademark infringement against: 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or 
association of such person with another person, or 
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 
her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person . . . . 218
                                                                                                             
214 See Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 960 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Gameologist Grp. LLC v. Sci. Games Int’l, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 141, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011).  Classic trademark infringement involves “forward” confusion.  Forward 
confusion occurs when a defendant attempts to capitalize on the trademark holder’s 
established reputation and good will by suggesting that its product or service emanates 
from the same source as, or is connected with, the trademark owner. See Johnny Blastoff, 
Inc. v. L.A. Rams Football Co., 188 F.3d 427, 436 (7th Cir. 1999); Fortres Grand, 2013 
WL 2156318, at *6, *10.  Reverse confusion occurs when a more famous commercial 
entity uses its size and market penetration to overpower or usurp the mark of the smaller, 
less famous trademark holder. See Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d 
481, 484 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 
215 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
216 False endorsement claims are less common. See Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 
1007, 1013, 1018–19 (3d Cir. 2008). 
217 Section 1125(a)(1) applies to unregistered marks, but § 1114 applies to registered 
marks: 
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant use in 
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation 
of a registered trademark in connection with the sale, offering for 
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in 
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the 
registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. 
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2005). 
218 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)) (2012); see also Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31 (explaining that 
“goods” are tangible products sold in the marketplace). 
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The touchstone of liability is whether the trademark is used in a 
“deceptive and misleading” way likely to cause consumer 
confusion about such association or endorsement.219
False endorsement occurs when the defendant uses a trademark 
in a way that is likely to confuse or deceive the average consumer 
regarding a trademark owner’s affiliation, connection, or 
association with the defendant’s goods or services.
 
220  This type of 
infringement does not require proof that consumers were actually 
confused, but only that they would likely be confused or deceived 
as to such association. 221
Although this is a lower threshold than actual confusion, it is 
nonetheless “a high bar.”
 
222  It demands more than simply 
referencing the trademark. 223  Instead, the mark must be used in a 
way that makes an affirmative statement of the trademark owner’s 
sponsorship or endorsement.224   In fact, in the context of false 
endorsement, because using another’s trademark to extract 
parasitic value is seldom deceptive,225 it generally does not 
constitute false endorsement.226
                                                                                                             
219 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28; see also Crystal Entm’t & Filmworks v. Jurado, 643 
F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2011); Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 682, 
689 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
 
220 See Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 960 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Gameologist Grp. LLC v. Sci. Games Int’l, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 141, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
221 See Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1021 (3d Cir. 2008) (a party must show 
only likelihood of confusion); see also Ray Commc’ns v. Clear Channel, 673 F.3d 294 
(4th Cir. 2012); Am. Family Life Ins. Co., 266 F. Supp. at 690–91 (only subsection 
(a)(1)(A) of 15 U.S.C. § 1125 includes the phrase “likely to cause confusion”). 
222 Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 3:12-cv-535, 2013 WL 2156318, 
at *10 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2013). 
223 See id. at *16; see also MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader, No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“‘one anecdotal instance of 
purported actual confusion is at best de minimis, indeed infinitesimal, and insufficient;’ a 
survey revealing a less than 3% rate of confusion was insufficient to show a likelihood of 
confusion.”) (quoting Brockmeyer v. Hearst Corp., 248, F. Supp.2d 281, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003)); Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 140 F. Supp.2d 241, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 
2001) (a survey showing a 7.84% confusion rate found to be insufficient to raise a 
material fact as to the likelihood of confusion). 
224 See Fortres Grand, 2013 WL 2156318, at *26 (“[T]his [is] a high bar.”) 
225 See Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
226 Even where risk of confusion exists, some courts have concluded that such use that 
otherwise would violate the Lanham Act is not actionable unless (1) the mark has no 
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When a trademark is used in an advertisement for a product, 
however, a consumer might reasonably presume some connection 
or endorsement between the trademark and the product.227  
Consequently, such uses may constitute infringement. 228  For 
example, the Ninth Circuit allowed Tom Waits to assert an 
unregistered commercial trademark in his distinctive vocal 
attributes.229  After Waits refused Frito-Lay’s endorsement offer, 
Frito-Lay used a sound-alike of him in an ad, and Waits sued 
Fritos for infringement.230  The court stated that because Waits’ 
trademark (his voice) was featured in a product ad, it was 
reasonable that consumers would mistakenly think he was 
endorsing that product.231  Accordingly, he was permitted to 
pursue his trademark infringement claim.232
By contrast, mentioning or displaying a trademark in a non-
commercial context does not present the same potential for 
confusion,
 
233 so it typically does not constitute infringement.234
                                                                                                             
artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever or, (2) it has some artistic relevance, 
but explicitly misleads as to the source or content of the work. See Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 
Trs. v. New Life Art Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1279  (11th Cir. 2012); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008); Browne v. McCain, 
611 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (noting artistic relevance test).  Essentially, 
if the use of a trademark is artistically relevant, then the use is either not infringing or will 
not be confusing, and thus is not infringement. 
   
227 See generally State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 343 
F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2003) (trademarks serve as a primary instrument “in the 
advertisement and sale of the seller’s goods”). 
228 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 1992); Arenas v. 
Shed Media, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1181,1188 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
229 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1107. 
230 Id. at 1106–07; see also Arenas, 881 F. Supp. at 1188. 
231 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1093, 1110–11. 
232 Id. at 1098, 1111; see also Abdul-Jabbar v. GMC, 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(false endorsement “based on the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s identity” is actionable 
as trademark infringement). 
233 See 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenY.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 695 (6th Cir. 
2003) (Lanham Act does not apply when using a trademark in a ‘non-trademark” way); 
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(trademark infringement does not apply to a “non-trademark use of a mark”); Fortres 
Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 3:12-cv-535, 2013 WL 2156318, at *7 (N.D. 
Ind. May 16, 2013); 4 ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 207, at § 22:25 (using the 
trademarked product, does not constitute infringement).  Courts typically assess 
likelihood of confusion by weighing several factors, but these are largely inapt to false 
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For example, a plotline of the movie The Dark Knight Rises 
involves a computer program called “Clean Slate” that can erase 
one’s criminal history from every computer database in the world, 
thereby giving a person a clean slate. 235  In reality, the Fortres 
Grand Corporation manufactures (and has trademarked in 
connection with) a software program called “Clean Slate” which 
protects the security of computer networks by erasing all evidence 
of user activity.236  Fortres Grand complained that by calling the 
fictional computer software “Clean Slate,” Warner Brothers 
(producers of The Dark Knight Rises) infringed on its 
trademark.237  The court rejected the claim.238  It explained that the 
film’s product was fictional, and “[t]here is no affirmative 
statement here that would indicate that Fortres Grand sponsored or 
endorsed the use of ‘clean slate’ in The Dark Knight Rises.”239 
Therefore, the use of the trademarked name could not infringe on 
Fortres Grand’s trademark, and the public would not be misled. 240
Rogers v. Grimaldi is further instructive.
 
241  There, a 
filmmaker made a movie “Ginger and Fred” about two fictional 
Italian dancers named Ginger and Fred.242
                                                                                                             
endorsement claims of the sort addressed in this article. The Second Circuit weighs eight 
factors first established in Polaroid: (1) strength of the mark; (2) degree of similarity 
between the marks; (3) proximity of the products or services; (4) likelihood that the prior 
owner will bridge the gap into the newcomer’s product or service line; (5) evidence of 
actual confusion; (6) whether the defendant adopted the mark in good faith; (6) the 
quality of defendants’ products or services; and (8) sophistication of the parties’ 
consumers. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).  The 
Ninth Circuit evaluates likelihood of confusion by considering: “(1) strength of the mark; 
(2) proximity or relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of 
actual confusion; (5) marketing channels; (6) type of goods and degree of purchaser care; 
(7) intent in selecting mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion.”  See Walter v. Mattel, Inc., 
210 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000). 
  Ginger Rogers 
complained that the movie’s title falsely implied that she was 
234 See Univ. of Ala. Bd. Of Trs. v. New Life Art Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 
2012); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
235 Fortres Grand, 2013 WL 2156318, at *3. 
236 Id. at 2. 
237 Id. at 7. 
238 Id. at 22. 
239 Id. at 26. 
240 Id. at 22. 
241 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
242 Id. at 996–97. 
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endorsing or featured in the film.243  The court disagreed, and 
concluded that any risk that the audience would be misled into 
thinking Rogers was associated with or endorsed the film was 
slight.244
This remains true when the physical or aural quality of a 
performer is integrated into a product or copyrighted work itself.  
For instance, singer Debra Laws complained when a J-Lo/L.L 
Cool J song sampled (pursuant to a copyright license) a portion of 
a record she had recorded.  Laws claimed that inasmuch as the new 
recording included her voice, it infringed on her vocal 
trademark.
 
245  In dismissing her claim, the court stated that since 
her voice was not used in an ad or connected to a commercial 
service, its use did not imply that she was endorsing a product.246  
In another case, a retired professional football player sued the 
Madden NFL video game for including his likeness.247  The court, 
held that “without more, [this was] insufficient to make the use 
explicitly misleading.”248
VII. USE IN COMMERCE 
 
Finally, to constitute infringement under Federal law, the 
trademark must be used in commerce.  Section 1125(a)(1) of the 
Lanham Act imposes liability on “[a]ny person who, on or in 
connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce any 
[trademark].”249
                                                                                                             
243 Id. at 997. 
  The definitional section of the statute states that: 
244 Id. at 1000. 
245 Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2006). 
246 Id.; see also Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1160–61 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(where there was no vocal impersonation, so consumers would not have believed that 
Henley had performed the campaign songs for or endorsed Devore.) 
247 Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01598-FMC-RZx, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
131387, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2009). 
248 Id. at *13. 
249 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (the Lanham Act’s reference to “goods” means 
“merchandise” or tangible products sold in the marketplace).  Section 114 provides that  
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant [] use in 
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation 
of a registered trademark in connection with the sale, offering for 
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in 
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For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be 
deemed to be in use in commerce . . . (2) on 
services when it is used or displayed in the sale or 
advertising of services and the services are rendered 
in commerce, or the services are rendered in more 
than one State or in the United States and a foreign 
country and the person rendering the services is 
engaged in commerce in connection with the 
services.250
In the typical infringement case, a defendant uses a trademark 
to pass off its goods or services as being provided or sponsored by 
the trademark owner.
 
251  Because these situations inevitably 
involve commercial businesses, consumers in the marketplace, and 
product packaging or advertising, their commerciality is beyond 
cavil.  Consequently, courts have had little occasion to look 
beyond the presence of the trademark itself and analyze the 
statute’s “commerce” language.252
False endorsement cases of the political ilk, however, differ 
significantly from the typical scenario.  A campaign’s playing 
music to fire up a crowd, as the candidate’s introduction theme, or 
while awaiting her arrival has no obvious commercial connotation.  
Arguably, music at public venues is so common that it imputes no 
special meaning.  Even if donations are solicited or a song is 
included in a political advertisement to express a campaign 
message, no product is sold, no commercial service is rendered (or 
no service is rendered in commerce), and no business entity is 
involved.  Therefore, the public performance, derivative use, or 
duplication of the copyrighted musical work might be implicated 
(as in Butler and Henley), but there is no reason for commercial 
enterprises or consumers making purchasing decisions to be 
confused.  Rather, the context is political.  Consequently, political 
 
                                                                                                             
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive [] shall be liable in a civil action by the 
registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. 
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2) (2005) (emphasis added). 
250 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
251 See Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 3:12-cv-535, 2013 WL 
2156318, at *4 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2013). 
252 See Interspace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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campaigns have argued that their uses of trademarks either are 
altogether immune from the Lanham Act or, in practice, do not 
meet its “commerce” requirement.253
The meaning of the statute’s “commerce” language is, 
therefore, critical when analyzing the viability of a false 
endorsement claim, and even more so when considering potential 
infringement by political campaigns.  This language, however, has 
been interpreted in different ways.
 
254  Depending on the 
interpretation, a political campaign’s use may be wholly exempt 
from a trademark infringement claim, fail to meet the prima facie 
elements of infringement, or be infringing in only limited 
situations.  Further complicating the issue is that some types of 
trademark infringement do not require a use in commerce.  The 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) (§1125(c)) exempts all 
“noncommercial” uses of a mark.255 Therefore, a trademark owner 
claiming dilution256 under the FTDA does not need to show that 
the defendant used its mark in commerce.257
A. The Unauthorized Use of the Trademark Must Occur in 
Commerce 
 
A number of courts read the “uses in commerce” language of § 
1114(1)(a) and § 1125(a)(1)(A) (“any person who uses in 
commerce any trademark . . . “) in conjunction with      § 1127’s 
                                                                                                             
253 See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp 2d 1125, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
254 See id. at 1131–32 (citing United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. 
N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
255 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2012) (“[T]he following shall not be actionable under this 
section: . . . (B) Noncommercial use of a mark”); see also MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader, 
No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
256 Dilution is “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services, regardless of (1) competition between the owner of the 
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).  The law governing dilution is independent from the law of 
trademark infringement. See Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 801 (6th Cir. 
2004).  “Dilution, unlike traditional trademark infringement law . . . is not based on a 
likelihood of confusion standard, but exists only to protect the quasi-property rights a 
holder has in maintaining the integrity and distinctiveness of his mark.”  Id. (citing 
Kellogg Co. v Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 628 (6th Cir. 2003).) 
257 See Moseley v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003); 
MasterCard, 2004 U.S Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *18–20. 
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definition of “use in commerce.”258  Specifically, these courts 
deem “use” and “in commerce” as separate elements of an 
infringement claim.259  Therefore, to establish a prima facie case of 
infringement, the trademark owner must show that the defendant 
“used” the mark in a particular way and must show that the use 
was in commerce.260  Consequently, only certain commercial uses 
of a mark constitute infringement.261
This is consistent with both the plain language of § 1127
 
262 and 
its history.  Section 1127 states that “use in commerce” means that 
the trademark is either physically placed on goods or services that 
the defendant sells or transports in commerce or is used in the sale 
or advertising of services that are rendered in commerce. 263
                                                                                                             
258 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); see also Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp 2d 1125, 1131 
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America 
New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1997)); MGM-Pathe Commns. Co. v. Pink 
Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on 
Social Networks: Trademark Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 
BUFFALO L. REV. 851, 874–75 (2010). 
  If the 
defendant’s use in commerce were unnecessary for infringement, 
this statutory provision would be superfluous.  Furthermore, as 
originally enacted, § 43(a) gave trademark owners a remedy 
against a person who used in commerce either “a false designation 
259 See, e.g., 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenY.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 492, 407 (2d Cir. 
2005); Time v. Peterson Publ’g Co., 173 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 1999); Estee Lauder Inc. 
v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1508–09 (2d Cir. 1997).; see also Ramsey, supra note 
258, at 874–75 
260 See 1-800- Contacts, 414 F.3d at 412; Time, 173 F.3d at 117; Estee Lauder Inc., 108 
F.3d at 1508; Ramsey, supra note 258, at 874–75. 
261 See Ramsey, supra note 258, at 874. 
262 The Supreme Court employs a plain language approach when interpreting statutory 
provisions. See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1264, 1266 (2011) 
(using plain meaning to interpret the term “personnel rules and practices” in Exemption 2 
of the Freedom of Information Act); CSX Transp. Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 131 S. 
Ct. 1101, 1108 (defining “tax” and “discriminate” according to their plain meaning). 
263 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1)(B) (2006) (“[A] mark shall be deemed to be in use in 
commerce—(1) on goods when—(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their 
containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or 
if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents 
associated with the goods or their sale, and (B) the goods are sold or transported in 
commerce, and (2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of 
services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more 
than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the 
services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services”). 
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of origin, or any false description or representation” in connection 
with “any goods or services.”264
B. A Trademark Must Be Used in Commerce to Earn Protection 
  Hence, it is reasonable that 
trademark infringement requires the defendant to use the trademark 
in commerce. 
A few commentators propose that “in commerce” pertains to 
the validity of the trademark itself.265  Under this view, since a 
putative trademark owner must demonstrate “the bona fide use of a 
mark in the ordinary course of trade” in order to protect a mark, § 
1127 simply enumerates which acts suffice as “bona fide uses of a 
mark in the ordinary course of trade.”266  The infringing use, 
however, need not occur in commerce.267
This logic is questionable.  That possession of a valid 
trademark requires its use in commerce does not mean that the 
allegedly infringing use need not be in commerce.  In other words, 
a trademark owner may need to prove, first, that it used the mark in 
commerce in order to claim it as a protectable trademark, and then 
that the defendant used the trademark in commerce for it to 
constitute infringement.  Indeed, since the Lanham Act is 
concerned with consumer confusion and unfair commercial 
competition due to unauthorized uses of commercial trademarks, 
and references “commerce” and “use in commerce” throughout, it 
is reasonable that both trademark ownership and trademark 
infringement contain commercial elements. 
 
C. Use in Commerce Is a Jurisdictional Predicate 
Other courts insist that the relevant language in §§ 1114(1)(a) 
and 1125(a)(1)(A) is not the phrase “use in commerce,” but the 
word “commerce.”268
                                                                                                             
264 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003) (citation 
omitted). 
  According to these courts, “in commerce” 
simply invokes Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
265 See Ramsey, supra note 258, at 874 (citing commentary by Graeme B. Dinwoodie & 
Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 
1597, 1609–12 (2007)). 
266 Id. at 874. 
267 Id. at 874–75. 
268 See Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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Clause,269 thereby articulating the jurisdictional predicate for 
federal regulation.270  In this view, infringement does not require 
that the defendant use the trademark in commerce, but only that the 
defendant’s use affect interstate commerce, such as by diminishing 
the trademark owner’s ability to control the use of its commercial 
mark.271
This position was adopted in a case involving the use of a 
Jackson Browne song in a political ad.
 
272   During the 2008 
Presidential election, the Ohio Republican Committee (on behalf 
of the Republican Party and nominee John McCain) produced an 
eighty-second advertisement273 that criticized Barack Obama’s 
energy policy amid rising gas prices,274 and featured a recording of 
Browne’s “Running on Empty.”275  Browne, a self-described 
liberal who supported Obama,276 alleged that this infringed on both 
his copyright (as the songwriter) and trademark (as the singer) by 
falsely suggesting that he sponsored, endorsed, or was associated 
with McCain “when nothing could be further from the truth.”277
                                                                                                             
269 See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 
92–93 (2d Cir. 1997); Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2009); 
Ramsey, supra note 
  
The Republican National Committee (RNC) moved to dismiss, 
contending that the Lanham Act applied only to commercial 
258, at 873–74. 
270 See Ramsey, supra note 258, at 874; see also United We Stand, 128 F.3d at 92–93 
(“[U]se in commerce reflects Congress’s intent to legislate to the limits of its authority 
under the Commerce Clause, rather than to limit the Lanham Act to profit-seeking uses of 
a trademark.”). 
271 See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d  at 1131–32; see also, e.g., Maier Brewing Co. v. 
Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 120 (9th Cir. 1968); Planned Parenthood 
Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 WL 133313  at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (noting that the scope of “in commerce” is broad). 
272 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1128. 
273 The Committee broadcast the ad on television and posted it on YouTube. Id. at 
1129. 
274 Id. at 1128 (complaint dismissed). 
275 Id. at 1128 (the commercial played “Running on Empty” in the background as it 
criticized Obama’s suggestion that the country could conserve gasoline by keeping their 
automobile tires inflated to the proper pressure.). 
276 See Geoff Boucher, Jackson Browne Sues John McCain over Song Use, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 14, 2008, 12:40 PM,, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2008/08/jackson-
browne.html (detailing Browne’s campaign contributions to Democrat candidates). 
277 Browne, 611 F. Supp. at 1127, 1129; see also Boucher, supra note 276. 
2013] I DO NOT ENDORSE THIS MESSAGE! 41 
 
speech so it could not apply to a political ad,278 and that because 
the ad was an “artistic work,” the First Amendment protected its 
use of Browne’s song.279
The court rejected the RNC’s argument that the Lanham Act 
was limited to commercial speech, and that Browne could not, as a 
matter of law, claim trademark infringement within a political 
context.
 
280  It explained that the Act’s reference to use “in 
commerce” simply articulated Congress’s regulatory authority 
under the commerce clause.281  Accordingly, Browne did not need 
to prove that the RNC had used his trademark in commerce, but 
only that the RNC’s use diminished his ability to control the use of 
his mark in commerce.282
The court also rejected the idea that the First Amendment 
barred a trademark infringement claim against political speech.
 
283  
It noted that other courts had applied the Lanham Act to political 
speech, and added that widespread confusion and negative 
consequences could result from political speech.284
Despite Browne concerning a singer’s trademark infringement 
claim against a political campaign, its precedential value to song 
marks and false endorsement is limited.  Aside from it being a trial 
court, because the court was ruling on a motion to dismiss, it was 
constrained to consider the facts in the light most favorable to 
 
                                                                                                             
278 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1131. 
279 Id.  When a Lanham Act claim is based on use of a mark in an artistic work, thereby 
implicating First Amendment interests, many courts analyze it under the Rogers artistic 
relevance test.  Under this test, an artistic work’s use of a trademark that otherwise would 
violate the Lanham Act is not actionable unless the use of the mark has “no artistic 
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless 
it explicitly misleads as to the source or content of the work.”  Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 
F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
280 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1132. 
281 Id. at 1131–32. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. at 1132–33.  The RNC argued that its use of a song in a political campaign was 
presumptively fair use. Id. at 1130.  The court, however, refused to dismiss the copyright 
claims, because the facts were not developed sufficiently to analyze the defense of fair 
use, and because the RNC had not established that the use of a copyrighted work in a 
political campaign was, as a matter of law, fair use. Id. at 1130–31. 
284 Id. at 1132 (citing United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 
128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1997) (trademark infringement claim against a political 
group) and MGM-Pathe Commc’ns. Co., 774 F. Supp. 869, 874–76 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
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Browne,285 namely, that Browne could establish ownership of a 
trademark and that the use impeded Browne’s control of it.  
Moreover, while the court held that a trademark owner is not 
required to show that the infringer used the mark in commerce, it 
did not address whether a song could be a trademark (or possessed 
by a performer).286
Furthermore, the case McCain cited to support its conclusion, 
United We Stand America,
  Consequently, that Browne defeated the 
RNC’s motion to dismiss does not indicate that he had a 
protectable trademark, let alone a winning trademark infringement 
claim, but only that the RNC did not have a winning motion. 
287 arose out of political campaigning 
but reflected a typical infringement scenario.  There, the disputed 
trademark related to election and political advocacy services, as 
did the allegedly infringing trademark, and the court’s analysis 
suggested that only certain types of uses constitute infringement.288
Back in 1992,
 
289 Ross Perot’s Presidential campaign committee 
established the “United Corporation” and trademarked “United We 
Stand America” as its service mark290 (associated with its political 
advocacy and campaign services). 291  It subsequently assigned to a 
third party the rights to “United We Stand America.”292  Later, an 
individual who had worked with the Perot campaign began using 
“United We Stand, America N.Y.” for his own political work.  In 
response, the trademark owner of “United We Stand America” 
claimed infringement.293
                                                                                                             
285 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1129.  When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, the court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws 
all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. See Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. 
Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004). 
  The issue was not whether disputes 
pertaining to politics were beyond the reach of the Lanham Act, 
but whether political services could fall within the scope of 
“services” and “use in commerce.”  The court held that the 
defendant’s political activities under the mark constituted 
286 It appears that the RNC simply focused on the political character of the ad. 
287 United We Stand Am., 128 F.3d at 92–93. 
288 Id. at 92. 
289 Id. at 88. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. 
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“services” “in commerce” subject to the Lanham Act.294  And 
because the marks and services provided under them were very 
similar, there was a likelihood of confusion.295  Indeed, 
MasterCard later noted that United We Stand was inapt to the use 
of a trademark in a political ad.296
VIII. CONFUSION DUE TO CAMPAIGN USES 
  Because a political ad invokes 
no potentially competing commercial services, there cannot be 
confusion about sourcing or sponsorship of those services by the 
trademark owner. 
Depending on a court’s interpretation of the Lanham Act’s 
“commerce” language, a political campaign’s use of a trademark 
may be exempt from a trademark infringement claim, fail to meet 
the prima facie elements of infringement, or be infringing in only 
limited situations. 
Nevertheless, with regard to song mark infringement by 
political campaigns, whether a mark must be used in commerce or 
what the phrase means may be irrelevant.  The Lanham Act is not a 
catchall statutory provision that converts any type of confusion 
into a legal cause of action.  Instead, a trademark’s purpose is to 
prevent consumer confusion about sources, services, and the 
trademark owner’s sponsorship or approval of them, so only uses 
likely to deceive consumers about those affiliations or related 
commercial matters constitute infringement.297
                                                                                                             
294 Id. at 89–93; see also id. at 90 (finding that a group soliciting donations, issuing 
press releases, holding press conferences, and organizing on behalf of its members’ 
interests is performing “services” within the meaning of the Lanham Act); Am. Family 
Life Ins. Co. V. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 694–95 (N.D. Ohio 2002); N.A.A.C.P v. 
N.A.A.C.P Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985) (indicating that Lanham Act remedies are “as available to 
public service organizations as to merchants and manufacturers”). 
  Accordingly, 
regardless of whether the trademark owner needs to prove that the 
295 United We Stand, 128 F.3d at 89–93. 
296 MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Nader, No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S Dist. LEXIS 
3644, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
297 See Eastland Music Grp., LLC v. Lionsgate Entm’t, Inc., 707 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 
2013) (quoting Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003)); Ray 
Commc’ns v. Clear Channel, 673 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2012); Hormel Foods Corp. v. 
Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1996); Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner 
Bros. Entm’t, No. 3:12-cv-535, 2013 WL 2156318 at *6 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2013). 
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alleged infringer (the candidate) used the song mark in commerce, 
it must, nonetheless, demonstrate that the candidate’s use resulted 
in the likely deception of consumers about commercial matters or 
the trademark owner’s affiliation with or approval of the 
politician’s commercial services or products.298  Consequently, the 
relevant question is whether a campaign’s use of a song would 
confuse consumers into thinking that the singer sponsors or 
endorses the commercial services of the politician.299
A. Absence of Commercial or Consumer Confusion 
 
First and fundamentally, since a politician is not engaged in 
commerce, there is no commercial matter and no consumers 
involved.  As a result, even if the use of the song mark created 
some type of confusion, it would not create consumer confusion 
about a commercial matter.  Therefore, it would not constitute 
trademark infringement.300
While voters compare political platforms and choose among 
candidates, voters are not consumers in the marketplace and 
candidates are not goods that they purchase.  A politician has no 
tangible goods or services to sell.  In fact, it is illegal for a 
politician to monetize the power to make political appointments, 
monetary appropriations, and votes.
 
301  And, while preventing 
confusion may aid in society’s political discourse,302 trademarks 
are not an election statute.303
                                                                                                             
298 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 
299 See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 
1993) (the relevant question is whether the defendant’s use of the mark “is misleading in 
the sense that it induces members of the public to believe [the work] was prepared or 
otherwise authorized” by the plaintiff). See generally Fortres Grand, 2013 WL 2156318. 
300 See Rearden, LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1214 (9th Cir. 2012); 
Fortres Grand, 2013 WL 2156318, at *6. 
301 See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (prohibiting 
candidates for office from announcing their “views on disputed legal or political issues”); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (outlining legal and ethical restrictions of 
politicians). 
302 See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
303 A sponsor of the amendments to section 43(a), House Representative Kastenmeier, 
stated that political advertising and promotion were not contemplated covered by the term 
“commercial.”  He explained that the statute uses the word “commercial” to describe 
advertising or promotion for business purposes, whether conducted by for-profit or non-
profit organizations or individuals.  Political advertising and promotion is political 
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To illustrate, one of Ralph Nader’s presidential campaign ads 
used MasterCard’s trademarked “Priceless” riffed off the popular 
MasterCard ads.  MasterCard complained that this infringed on 
their trademark “Priceless” which designated its credit and 
financial services.  The court, however, held that Nader’s use of 
trademark was not commercial, so it was permissible.304  It 
observed that MasterCard’s “Priceless” campaign was well-known 
and more importantly, the credit and financial services that it 
designated had no rational connection to Nader’s political 
candidacy.  As a result, the average consumer would not have been 
misled into thinking that MasterCard was connected with the 
campaign or endorsing Nader.305
Using a song in a political advertisement does not alter this 
conclusion.
 
306  The media format of a commercial is not equivalent 
to a commercial use or commercial speech.  Although the 
boundary between commercial and non-commercial speech can be 
unclear, the Supreme Court has clarified it is the content of the 
message articulated and not its form (“commercial speech” as 
opposed to a commercial advertisement) that controls.307  The core 
notion of commercial speech is that it does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction.308
A political ad may be in the form of a commercial or possess 
“commercial-like” qualities, but it clearly does more than propose 
a commercial transaction; it seeks to educate, convince, and gain 
the support of voters.  Indeed, courts and agencies that have 
considered campaign advertisements and solicitation of donations 
have concluded that they are not “commercial speech,” but 
political speech.
 
309
                                                                                                             
speech, and therefore not encompassed by the term “commercial.”  134 Cong. Rec. 
H.1297 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1989) (statement of Wisconsin Rep. Kastenmeier). 
  With regard to music in political ads, if the 
304 MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader, No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S Dist. LEXIS 
3644, at *28–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
305 Id. at *8–9. 
306 The use, however, would implicate the rights of the copyright holder of the work. 
307 See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001). 
308 See id. at 409; Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t., No. 3:12-cv-535, 2013 
WL 2156318, at * 11 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2013). 
309 See Fed. Election Comm. v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 
431, 440 (2001) (spending for political ends and contributing to political candidates both 
fall within the First Amendment’s protection of speech and political association”); 
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song itself expresses a discernible message relevant to the 
campaign, it is substantively speech.310
B. Reasonable Likelihood of Confusion 
  Even if the song has no 
obvious message, but is used as a melody or musical bed, it would, 
nonetheless, be in a political advertisement. 
Second, aside from who might be confused, confusion due to 
hearing a song is highly unlikely.  After all, playing and listening 
to music is what music is for.  The public constantly hears music in 
stores, at sporting events, on hold with customer service, and at the 
dentist’s office.  Yet, the public does not become bewildered nor 
do they interpret hearing the music as a singer’s endorsement of 
the respective commercial establishments, athletic teams, and 
endodontic procedures.  There is no reason that the public would 
perceive music at a political event or in an ad any differently.311  In 
fact, playing an aural trademark is comparable to a gym 
broadcasting a song over satellite radio or a runner wearing a t-
shirt emblazoned with a brand.  Both are permissible, non-
commercial uses, and neither causes the average person to think 
that the brand is affirmatively sponsoring the athlete.312
When music fans play a song, they realize that it does not mean 
that the artist is personally endorsing them, but that they are 
appreciating the song and/or artist.  Hence, the relationship 
between a candidate and music is that of a fan who likes a song, 
not the other way around.  In fact, research shows that today’s 
voters are interested in candidates’ personalities and lives outside 
 
                                                                                                             
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (political campaign contribution and expenditure 
limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities); Am. 
Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 697  (N.D. Ohio 2002) (candidate’s 
soliciting donations and voters visiting political website is not commercial speech, but 
political). 
310 By the same token, that words are uttered by a politician does not render them 
“political speech.”  Nonetheless, while a political purpose may not bar a trademark (or 
copyright) infringement claim, once the facts are considered, the First Amendment or 
political message might be an adequate defense against any infringement claim. See Am. 
Family Life Ins. Co., 266 F. Supp at 701. 
311 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1636–37 (2006) (correlating case law pertaining to 
communicative strength of a mark and whether a court finds use confusing). 
312 See 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenY.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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of the political arena.313  A candidate’s taste in music is one clue 
voters use to discern a candidate’s personality314 and identify with 
them.315  As a result, in recent Presidential elections, candidates 
have released their iPod playlists to give the public a better sense 
of who they are.316
It follows that when the public hears “American Girl” or 
“Wavin’ Flag” at a campaign event, in an ad, or on a candidate 
playlist, it understands it the same way, that the candidate either 
likes the song or is using it to convey a message.  This is how 
viewers interpreted The Roots’ playing “Lyin’ Ass Bitch’ to 
introduce Bachmann; viewers who recognized the song believed 
that The Roots were communicating their opinion about 
Bachmann, not that the original performer Fishbone was endorsing 
Bachmann’s candidacy. 
 
Additionally, the only indication of confusion is anecdotal 
evidence from singers who complain that fans might think they 
sold out or endorse the candidate.317  While a musical artist’s 
objection demonstrates that any implication of endorsement would 
be false, unsubstantiated fear is not proof that music consumers 
would think that a candidate’s musical choice indicates an artist’s 
endorsement.318
                                                                                                             
313 See Florian Haumer & Wolfgang Donsbach, The Rivalry of Nonverbal Cues on the 
Perception of Politicians by Television Viewers, 53 J. BROADCAST. & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 
262, 263–64 (2009); Jordan, supra note 8, at 102. 
  Furthermore, inasmuch as this inference 
presumes that a singer has a right to permit or deny the use of a 
song, any audience confusion reflects a common misapprehension 
314 See Haumer & Donsbach, supra note 313, at 263–64; Jordan, supra note 8, at 102–
03. 
315 See Jordan, supra note 8, at 103. 
316 See id. at 102. 
317 K’naan, for instance, said that he was flooded with Twitter messages accusing him 
of selling out. See McKinley, supra note 2. 
318 A possibility of confusion is lesser and not equivalent to a likelihood of confusion. 
See A & H Sportswear v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, 166 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 1999).  To 
illustrate, Henley submitted survey evidence that audience members might believe that 
Henley approved of the campaign’s use of the Plaintiffs’ songs. The court, however, 
stated that this was not probative of whether people would reasonably think that Henley 
performed the music in the videos.  “To the extent that the [survey information] indicates 
a likelihood that Henley’s endorsement was based purely on the use of his music, this is 
not a cognizable injury.”  Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d. 1144, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 
2010). 
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about copyright and music rights, not confusion about a 
commercial matter.  In any event, it might be infuriating when a 
candidate whom the singer dislikes uses a song, but to the extent 
that the audience is aware of a singer’s politics, it would realize 
that the song is not an endorsement. 
Indeed, it seems that the crux of these complaints is that the 
artist disapproves of the candidate and does not want it to bask in 
the glow of the artist, or wants to remain free of any connection.  
Although a performer’s frustration might be understandable, it 
does not engender a legal right.  When creations such as music and 
movies are made available to the public, all members of the public 
may use and enjoy them.  If a vocalist wants to ensure that people 
she disapproves of cannot play songs she has performed, then she 
must not make her performances and recordings available.  Even 
copyright authors do not possess such an ideological or protective 
associational right.319
IX. COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION 
 
Independent of the legal theory of song mark protection is 
whether a legal action to enforce of such a right is subject to 
preemption.  A song-trademark founded on the performance of a 
musical work or sound recording implicates copyright.  The 
Copyright Act establishes a comprehensive statutory scheme 
governing the existence and scope of protection for “original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”320  This includes musical compositions, lyrics, and 
sound recordings.321
                                                                                                             
319 Alternatively, the musical artist might fear “guilt by association,” that if music 
consumers or record companies’ dislike of the politician, they might not purchase the 
artist’s records or services.  This, however, does not fit into false endorsement, but 
somewhat more akin to an insufficient tarnishment claim. 
  As explained in Dastar, which involved an 
unsuccessful trademark claim over an expired copyrighted work, 
320 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006).  “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of 
expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of 
the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2010). 
321 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2)(7) (2006). 
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the rights of copyright are part of a “carefully crafted bargain,”322 
and courts must prevent trademark and related protections from 
encroaching on areas traditionally occupied by copyright.323
To maintain copyright’s dominion,
 
324 the Copyright Act 
includes a broad preemption provision325
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that [1] are equivalent 
to any of the exclusive rights within the general 
scope of copyright as specified by section 106 (i.e., 
the right to reproduce, prepare derivative works, 
distribute, publicly perform, or display) in [2] works 
of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression and come within the subject matter of 
copyright as specified by §§ 102 and 103 . . . are 
governed exclusively by this title.
 found in section 301.  It 
provides that: 
326
Essentially, when some other right collides with copyright, § 
301 determines the right of way.
 
327  Typically, if the asserted right 
is equivalent to those of copyright, it must yield.328  As applied to a 
song, though a musical composition sometimes can be protected by 
both trademark and copyright, preemption often precludes 
concurrent, co-equal protection.329
                                                                                                             
322 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003). 
 
323 See id.; TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001). 
324 See Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(section 301 ensures that the enforcement of these rights remains solely within the federal 
domain). 
325 This type of “ordinary preemption” is a substantive, affirmative defense that state 
claims have been substantively displaced by federal law.  Complete preemption is not a 
defense, but a jurisdictional rule for assessing federal removal jurisdiction when a 
complaint raises only state law claims. See Stuart Weitzman, LLC v. Microcomputer 
Res., Inc., 542 F.3d 859, 864 (11th Cir. 2008). 
326 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006). 
327 Id. 
328 Id. 
329 See Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2011) (copyright protection 
does not render songs “ineligible for protection as trademarks”). 
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A. Scope of Preemption 
To be preempted by § 301, the asserted right must be 
equivalent to330 a right contained in § 106.331  Though preemption 
is most obvious when a theory of legal recovery directly conflicts 
with copyright, a cause of action need not be identical to a 
copyright claim to be preempted.332  If, notwithstanding its label, 
the claim attempts “to prevent nothing more than the reproduction, 
performance, distribution of a . . . performance captured [in a 
tangible medium]”333 or its underlying nature is part and parcel of 
a copyright claim, it is an equivalent right preempted by  § 301. 334
Importantly, § 301 does not state that the asserted right itself 
involve a tangible copyrightable work enumerated in §§ 102 or 
103.  Instead, it asks whether the rights asserted are equivalent to 
 
                                                                                                             
330 See Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(“[R]eference must be made to the elements of the state cause of action”). 
331 Section 106 grants an author/owner five divisible rights to do or authorize the 
following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to 
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, 
or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture 
or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; 
and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. 
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 
332 See Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1239–40 
(C.D. Cal. 1987). 
333 Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1995) (claim preempted because the 
core of theory of recovery was the wrongful copying, distribution, and performance of a 
song’s lyrics); see also Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
334 See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134,1143–45 (9th Cir. 2006); Fleet, 58 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649–50 (performance captured in a tangible medium is subsumed by 
copyright and preempted); cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 
195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (the alternative and 
copyright claims both rest on the unauthorized publication). 
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the kinds of exclusive rights articulated in § 106,335
This requires identifying what rights a claim seeks to vindicate 
and evaluating them against those of § 106.
 the section of 
the Copyright Act that enumerates the rights granted in 
copyrightable works (which, in turn, are listed in §§ 102 and 103).  
Put another way, § 301 asks whether the right asserted is 
comparable to any of the rights that a § 102 or 103 work would 
possess, namely, those enumerated in § 106. 
336  If they are 
comparable to those of § 106, such as when the plaintiff attempts 
to control the reproduction, public performance, or distribution of a 
copyrighted work or performance captured in a tangible work, the 
claim is preempted.337  If they are qualitatively different from 
those of copyright (or that would be exercised by a copyright 
holder), they are not.338
Where the alternative cause of action is qualitatively different 
than a copyright claim (and does not assert control over a 
copyrighted work), it is not preempted.
 
339  Often, this is readily 
apparent because the alternative cause of action contains different 
elements than a copyright claim.  Importantly, it is not the presence 
of an additional element that rescues a claim from preemption,340 
but the impact of that element, namely that the extra element 
transforms the nature of the claim.  Consequently, while a claim 
premised on a copyrighted work or component is preempted, a 
misappropriation or publicity claim unrelated to a copyrighted 
work, is different from a copyright claim and is not preempted.341
                                                                                                             
335 See Foley v. Luster, 249 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2001). 
  
336 See Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs.,Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(“[R]eference must be made to the elements of the state cause of action”). 
337 See Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650–51. 
338 See Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 501 (7th Cir. 2011); Laws, 448 F.3d at 
1143–45; Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 909–10 (7th Cir. 2005); Aronson v. 
Dog Eat Dog Films, 738 F.Supp. 2d 1104, 1116 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 650–51 (performance captured in a tangible medium is subsumed by copyright law 
and preempted). 
339 See Laws, 448 F.3d at 1144–45; Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649. 651. 
340 See Laws, 448 F.3d at 1144 (“Although the elements of Laws’ state law claims may 
not be identical to the elements in a copyright action, the underlying nature of Laws’ state 
law claims is part and parcel of a copyright claim.”). 
341 The House of Representatives Report on the amendments to the preemption 
provisions stated that because misappropriation is not necessarily synonymous with 
copyright infringement, a misappropriation claim might not be preempted, provided it is 
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For instance, California’s privacy and publicity law sometimes 
protects iconic musical artists from the commercial use of sound-
alike performers.342  Provided that claim is not premised on and 
does not exercise control over a copyrighted work, it is not 
preempted.343
Courts have formulated preemption analysis into various tests.  
Some courts first examine the asserted claim “to determine 
whether it falls ‘within the subject matter of copyrights defined by 
17 U.S.C. § 102,” and then review the cause of action “to 
determine if it protects rights that are ‘equivalent’ to any of the 
exclusive rights of a federal copyright, as provided in 17 U.S.C. § 
106.”
 
344  Other courts consider whether a claim meets both a 
“general scope requirement,”345 and a “subject matter 
requirement.”346  If it meets both, the claim is preempted.347  To 
the extent that this asks whether the claim involves a work that 
falls within §§ 102 or 103, can be more demanding.  This is 
exemplified by the Seventh Circuit’s version: “First, the work in 
which the right is asserted must be fixed in tangible form and come 
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by § 102.  
Second, the right must be equivalent to any of the rights specified 
in § 106.”348
                                                                                                             
not based on a right within the general scope of copyright as specified by 17 U.S.C. § 106 
or on a right equivalent thereto. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748. 
  This, however, either inartfully implies or 
inaccurately assumes that the claim involves an underlying work 
that itself is copyrightable or tangible and that such work is among 
those identified in §§ 102 or 103. 
342 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford 
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988). 
343 See, e.g., Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1029 (3d Cir. 2008); Waits, 978 
F.2d at 1100; Midler, 849 F.2d at 460, 462. 
344 Globeranger Corp. v. Software AG, 691 F.3d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 456 (5th Cir. 2003).) 
345 In other words, does it seek to vindicate legal or equitable rights equivalent to one of 
the bundle of exclusive rights protected by § 106? 
346 In other words, is the work in question of the type protected under 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 
and 103? 
347 See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1997). 
348 Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 674 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). 
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To the extent that a preemption analysis demands some 
tangible copyrightable corpus or suggests a claim that includes an 
uncopyrightable element does not fall within §§ 102 or 103 and 
thus escapes preemption, it misstates the statute.  It may also open 
the door for performers to raise (albeit, incorrectly) publicity and 
misappropriation claims based on the theory that ephemeral 
identity cannot be copyrighted or assert that where an alternative 
claim includes a prima facie element distinct from a copyright 
claim, it is not preempted. 
B. Preemption of Uncopyrightable Qualities and Components of 
Copyrighted Works 
Performers asserting identity-based rights have argued that 
because neither voice nor identity is copyrightable, claims based 
on voice or identity are not preempted—either they do not fall 
within  §§ 102 and 103, and therefore are not within the subject 
matter of copyright, or they do not possess the rights enumerated in 
§ 106, so they cannot be preempted.349
Preemption’s purpose is to deprive states the power to bestow 
copyright-like protections on materials that Congress intended to 
be uncopyrightable or in the public domain.
  This logic is flawed and 
consistently has been rejected by courts. 
350  Therefore, it can 
function properly only if the “subject matter of copyright” is 
construed to include all works of a type covered by §§ 102 and 
103, even if federal law does not protect them.351  If it were 
otherwise, states could expand copyright protection as far as they 
wish, on the theory that the materials protected or rights granted by 
the state did not meet federal copyright standards, so they were not 
preempted.352
                                                                                                             
349 See generally Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 
350 See Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 501 (7th Cir. 2011); Toney v. L’Oreal 
USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 
(1985) (allowing states to expand copyright protection to works Congress deemed 
uncopyrightable would defeat the Act’s central purpose). 
351 See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 850 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
352 See R.W. Beck, Inc. v. E3 Consulting, LLC, 577 F.3d 1133, 1146–47 (10th Cir. 
2009); NBA, 105 F.3d at 849. 
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The assertion that since voice is not copyrightable, voice-
related claims are not within the scope of copyright ignores the 
copyrightable work through which or in which the voice is 
expressed, that is, works within §§ 102 and 103.  Case law is clear 
that inasmuch as they are part of a copyrighted work, the 
uncopyrightable components comprising that work,353 such as 
facts,354 ideas,355 or performances,356 come within “the broad 
ambit of the subject matter categories” of  § 102.357  “[A] party 
who does not hold the copyright in a performance captured on film 
cannot prevent the one who does from exploiting it by resort to 
state law.”358
For example, while on a trip, Ken Aronson injured himself and 
landed in the hospital.
 
359  His friend captured this on a video, 
which he later allowed Michael Moore to use in his documentary 
Sicko.360  Though Aronson sued Moore for misappropriation as 
well as copyright infringement, the court held both claims 
preempted.361  It explained that although Aronson’s “persona” was 
not a work within § 102, the video capturing his persona was.362  
Since his claims arose out of the use and distribution of that 
copyrighted video, it was equivalent to the assertion of a right 
within copyright.363
                                                                                                             
353 See R.W. Beck, 577 F.3d at 1146–47; NBA, 105 F.3d at 849 (“Copyrightable 
material often contains uncopyrightable elements within it, but Section 301 preemption 
bars state law . . . claims with respect to uncopyrightable as well as copyrightable 
elements.”). 
  Similarly, professional baseball players who 
appeared in games copyrighted to and broadcast by the MLB, sued 
354 See Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 200 (discussing President Ford’s memoirs 
containing uncopyrightable facts). 
355 See Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(discussing the non-copyrightable elements of an entertainment project, like ideas, are not 
sufficient to remove from preemption). 
356 See generally Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134  (9th Cir. 2006); see also 
Part III, infra. 
357 Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306. 
358 Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652–53. 
359 See Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog Films, 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1108–09 (W.D. Wash. 
2010). 
360 Id. at 1108–09. 
361 Id. at 1114, 1116. 
362 Id. at 1116. 
363 Id. 
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MLB for using their images without their consent.364  Because the 
claim rested on their identities captured in a copyrighted work, the 
court held that the claim was preempted.365
In another case involving an appearance in a film, CBS 
purchased the exclusive rights to distribute and broadcast a 
copyrighted movie.
 
366  When the producers of the film failed to 
pay the actors’ salaries, the actors sued CBS for the unauthorized 
use of their likenesses and violation of their rights of publicity.367  
Again, the court recognized that the actors were attempting to 
control the distribution, display, and performance of a copyrighted 
movie.368  Once those performances were incorporated into the 
film, they were “‘dramatic works’ ‘fixed in [a] tangible medium of 
expression’” and within the scope or subject matter of copyright.369  
Consequently, the claims were preempted.370  Similarly, the NBA 
complained that Motorola was reporting the scores and facts of 
basketball games broadcast by the NBA.371  Unable to bring a 
copyright infringement action,372 the NBA framed its claim as 
tortious behavior.373  This, too, was unsuccessful.  The court 
concluded that because the NBA’s complaint was about the 
reproduction, distribution, and display of the facts within the 
copyrighted broadcasts, it was within the scope of copyright, and 
preempted.374
Identity and misappropriation claims by musical artists based 
on the use of records have also been held to be preempted.  For 
 
                                                                                                             
364 See Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 674–
79 (7th Cir. 1986). 
365 Id. (inasmuch as athletes’ images were broadcast as part of copyrighted games, 
players’ right of publicity claims were preempted by copyright). 
366 See Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
367 Id. at 646–47. 
368 Id. at 651.  Unable to collect from the movie’s producers, the actors sued CBS for 
violating their right of publicity. Id. at 646–47. 
369 Id. at 650. 
370 Id. at 652–53. 
371 See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848–49 (2d Cir. 1997). 
372 Id. at 848–49 (“Although game broadcasts are copyrightable while the underlying 
games are not, the Copyright Act should not be read to distinguish between the two when 
analyzing the preemption of a misappropriation claim based on copying or taking from 
the copyrightable work.”). 
373 Id. at 848. 
374 Id. at 848–49. 
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example, recording artist Debra Laws recorded “Very Special” 
under a contract with Elektra /Asylum Records.375  That contract 
gave Elektra the exclusive rights to the master recordings, 
including the rights to “lease, license, convey or otherwise use or 
dispose of such master recordings,” and permit others to use Law’s 
name and likeness in connection with the recordings.376  Years 
later, Elektra licensed the recording to Sony Music to sample in the 
Jennifer Lopez / L.L. Cool J song “All I Have.”377  Elektra credited 
Laws but did not obtain her permission.378  In response, Laws sued 
Sony not for copyright infringement, but for misappropriation of 
her name and voice sampled in “All I Have.”379  Laws argued that 
since she was not challenging the use of the copyrighted sound 
recording, but rather the use of her name and voice in the sound 
recording, her claims were substantively different from and outside 
of the subject matter of Copyright law.380
Recognizing that the crux of Laws’ complaint was about the 
use of the copyrighted sound recording, the court rejected her 
restyled copyright plea.  It explained that the crux of Laws’ 
complaint was about the use of the copyrighted sound recording.
 
381  
The copyright owner had the exclusive right to permit 
reproduction, derivative use, or performance of the copyrighted 
work, and had properly licensed the work to Sony. 382  Hence, the 
subject matter of her claims fell within the subject matter of the 
Copyright Act.383  With regard to Laws’ assertion that her 
misappropriation claim required proof of the extra element of 
“commercial purpose” (which copyright infringement did not) and 
protected different rights than copyright, the court explained that 
the additional element did not change the underlying nature of the 
action.384  Consequently, her claims were preempted. 385
                                                                                                             
375 See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134,1135–36 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 
376 See id. at 1136. 
377 See id. 
378 Id. (the credits of the sound recording read, “Featuring samples from the Debra 
Laws recording ‘Very Special.’”). 
379 Id. (discussing misappropriation of identity for commercial purposes). 
380 Id. at 1138, 1144. 
381 Id. at 1144. 
382 Id. at 1144–45. 
383 Id. at 1136–38, 1144. 
384 Id. at 1144–45. 
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Digable Planets’ trademark infringement and misappro-
priation386 complaints regarding Target’s use of “Rebirth of Slick” 
fared no better.387  Digable Planets argued that because its 
complaint was not about the use of the copyrighted song, but about 
the unauthorized use of their uncopyrightable voices, its claims 
were not preempted.388  The court, however, explained that 
Digable Planets was not claiming that Target’s ads used 
impersonations of them, but that the ads used their copyrighted 
sound recording and composition.389  Because the claims arose out 
of Target’s use of the copyrighted works,390 the claims were within 
the subject matter of copyright,391 and preempted.392  Butler and 
Laws underscore that the mere presence of an additional element in 
or alternative label for the alternative claim will not rescue it from 
preemption.393  Rather, that extra element must transform the 
nature of the cause of action into something qualitatively different 
than a copyright claim.394
X. WHAT RIGHTS DOES A SONG MARK SEEK TO VINDICATE? 
 
Fundamentally, a song mark asserts a right to control and 
prohibit the use, adaptation, and public performance of a musical 
composition and/or the sound recording that includes the vocals.  
These are not merely equivalent to rights within the purview of 
copyright, they are precisely the rights granted by Copyright law.  
A song mark is not solely voice or persona expressed via aural 
frequency, but is founded on a copyrighted composition or a sound 
recording, both of which are works within §§ 102 and 103.  This is 
                                                                                                             
385 Id. 
386 See Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
387 Id. at 1054. 
388 Id. at 1056. 
389 Id. 
390 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2)(7) (2006)). 
391 Butler, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. 
392 Id. at 1054–56. 
393 See id. at 1144–45 (“Although the elements of Laws’ state law claims may not be 
identical to the elements in a copyright action, the underlying nature of Laws’ state law 
claims is part and parcel of a copyright claim). 
394 See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1139, 1144 –45 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Fleet v. 
CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
58 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:1 
 
further apparent when recognizing the perverse impact a song 
mark would have on the rights of a copyright holder.  Because a 
performer could wield a song mark to prohibit uses of works by the 
copyright owners, a song mark would extinguish the rights of a 
copyright holder.  In fact, the performer would have a right 
superior to them.395
Additionally, while ephemeral voice may not be copyrightable, 
a recording of a voice performing a musical composition or fixed 
in a sound recording is.  When identity is evidenced through the 
performance of or captured in a copyrighted work, it is subsumed 
by the copyrighted work.  As a result, it becomes part of a 
copyright claim.  Because the copyrighted work as a whole 
satisfies the subject matter requirement, it is preempted.
  It is therefore clear that such a claim and 
attempt to control identity through song mark is preempted. 
396
CONCLUSION 
  Indeed, 
while the statute does not protect voice as a copyrighted work, it 
does contemplate voice as a mechanism by which to exercise the 
rights granted by copyright.  Consequently, voice may not be 
tangible, but as an instrument to perform or exercise a right under 
copyright, it is within the purview of Copyright law.  There is a 
difference between a claim that falls outside of the subject matter 
of copyright and a claim that does not meet the prima facie 
requirements of a copyright action.  That a performer would not be 
able to bring a copyright infringement action does not mean the 
performer’s claims are not within the purview of copyright and 
rescued from preemption.  Instead, it means that the singer would 
not prevail in a copyright lawsuit.  Nonetheless, § 301 does not 
create a cognizable right in anything that is not protected by 
copyright, but ensures copyright’s preeminence of scope. 
The complex intersections of trademark and copyright, 
exacerbated by the interests of performers in managing their 
artistic personas and politicians in connecting with voters, have 
                                                                                                             
395 Additionally, rights would no longer be divisible, because once a singer performed 
the work, she would obtain control over it as a song mark. 
396 See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(section 301 preempts the uncopyrightable elements along with the copyrightable ones). 
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cultivated an environment where these rights involved are 
commonly misconstrued and the stakes are high.  With the 2016 
election season already upon us, these disputes will only continue 
to arise until the issue is addressed. 
Although it is understandable that a performer would not want 
a politician she opposes to use what she considers to be “her” song, 
this type of personal objection is not equivalent to a protectable 
legal interest.  Performers do not possess proprietary rights in the 
works they perform, and cannot leverage participation into rights 
superior to those of the copyright owners of such works.  
Moreover, restyling this as a trademark claim cannot alter its 
fundamental nature—any attempt to control the use of vocal 
identity in a musical work necessarily attempts to control the 
underlying copyrighted work.  Thus, any issue or right falls within 
the purview of (and is preempted by) the Copyright Act.  Indeed, 
several courts have observed that performance-based rights of this 
ilk would conflict with copyright and wreak havoc on long-
established understandings of trademark and commercial practices.  
While economic inconvenience does not extinguish a legitimate 
right, here it reveals the inherent conflict between song marks and 
Copyright law.  Nevertheless, § 1125 (a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act 
does not prohibit any unauthorized use of a trademark, but only 
ones likely to deceive consumers about commercial matters.  
Because a politician is not a commercial enterprise providing a 
tangible product or service, its use of a song mark, even if 
misleading, could not reasonably result in consumer confusion 
about a commercial matter.  Consequently, it does not amount to 
trademark infringement. 
